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INTRODUCTION 
Few arguments echo as strongly throughout United States 
constitutional history as those related to the role of the states in the 
federal union. Although scholars debate the extent to which 
federal and state powers were ever strictly separated, the states and 
the federal government today occupy overlapping spheres. In the 
modern context of overlapping powers, the pre-emption doctrine 
manages the intricate areas of overlap,1 with topics ranging from 
banking, to food and drug laws, to immigration. As a general 
matter, overlapping and concurrent powers are the norm, even 
when the federal government has staked out considerable territory. 
In one critical modern arena, however, the role of the states 
has been relegated to little more than the curtailment of active 
fraud. It is an insidious notion, rooted in a mistaken twist of 
precedent, that then winds its way through various doctrines, 
increasingly circumscribing the ability of the states to act. Patent 
law is this arena, and here, the various threads come together 
resulting in a positive chokehold on any state activity. 
Paralysis for the states is occurring at a particularly important 
time in the history of patent law. Government actors at many levels 
are grappling with the emergence of a new business model in 
patents. It is popularly called patent trolling or more tamely non-
practicing entity (NPE) activity or patent assertion entity (PAE) 
activity. In this model, the core business involves licensing and 
litigating stripped patent rights, as opposed to making products 
with those patents. The rapid expansion of this business model 
over the last decade has left courts and legislators grappling with its 
legal implications.  
The relevant federalism question concerns the extent to which 
state laws that affect this type of business are valid. In other words, 
does a state have the power to say that if one wishes to engage in 
the business of asserting patents in this state, here are the basic 
codes by which one must abide? In the modern context of 
overlapping federal and state powers, this is classic territory, 
involving both a state’s traditional ability to regulate business 
within its borders and a federally-created scheme that involves the 
power of federal sovereignty.  
At present, courts and some early commentators have 
concluded that states are confined to a tiny corner, policing 
                                            
1.  See generally Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The 
Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253 
(tracing the evolution of preemption doctrine).   
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occurrences of outright bad faith or fraudulent activity. In the 
patent context, these notions are generally defined to mean that the 
patent holder’s statements are objectively false and the patent 
holder knows they are false.2  
Such a limitation on the power of the states cannot possibly be 
right. Surely, if a patent holder sends a letter saying, “If you do not 
buy a patent license from me, I will kill your family,” the state may 
have something to say about it. This should be true even if the 
patent is valid and the patent holder has a sufficiently plausible 
infringement argument to withstand a charge of sham litigation. A 
state must be able to specify certain things one cannot do with 
one’s patent. And in that context, fraud cannot be the sole domain 
in which the state may operate.   
Some readers may think that the above example is simply a 
straw man; no one could possibly take the position that states are 
forbidden to act against such a threat. To those readers, I would 
note that at a recent conference presenting this Article, one patent 
scholar argued vigorously that states should be impotent to act if a 
patent holder threatens to kill one’s family unless one pays for a 
patent license. The scholar asserted that only the federal 
government could respond, and any power to respond would have 
to be found in the Patent Act.  
This view might come as a surprise to state law enforcement 
agencies, which are generally accustomed to having the power to 
bring criminal charges for a threat of murder. Nevertheless, it is 
emblematic of a strain of patent law analysis that sees states as 
severely limited in their power over any activity in which patents 
appear. 
At a broader level, if states have the power to regulate 
disclosure in the sale of federal securities, transparency for banking 
                                            
2.  See Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., Inc. 362 F.3d 
1367, 1375–76 & n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (applying Supreme Court precedents in 
antitrust cases to conclude that state lawsuits related to patent demand actions 
outside of litigation must demonstrate that the behavior is both objectively and 
subjectively baseless); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Preemption, 101 VA. 
L. REV. 1579, 1618–19 (2015) (explaining that while good faith takes on different 
meanings in different contexts, good faith in patent enforcement has traditionally 
referred to whether the speaker sincerely believed in the truth of the statement); 
see also Activision TV, Inc. v. Pinnacle Bancorp, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 
1166–69 (D. Neb. 2013) (issuing preliminary injunctions against the Attorney 
General of Nebraska restraining the office from enforcing orders against two 
parties for their patent demand letters on the grounds that demand letters are 
preempted absent a showing of bad faith; allegations of unfair and deceptive 
practices contained in the Attorney General’s papers apparently were 
insufficient). 
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and real estate transactions, and pressure sales tactics for businesses 
from automobiles to insurance, why should states remain silent 
when the topic of commerce is intellectual property?3 Commercial, 
contractual, and consumer laws traditionally are viewed as 
appropriate forums for reflecting and promoting local values—ones 
that may vary across state jurisdictions.4 Quite simply, the states 
must be left with something to do.5  
Leaving room for state activity is particularly important in the 
modern context of overlapping and concurrent federal and state 
powers. As one scholar has noted, “[p]reemption must be cabined 
more carefully . . . in a concurrent world where preemptive federal 
action threatens to cut off state access to the wellsprings of popular 
support.”6  
Fraud is certainly valid terrain for state activity. Rather than 
understanding fraud as an example of the territory in which a state 
may tread, however, the lower courts have seized hold of the fraud 
example and transformed it into a bright line beyond which a state 
may not pass. As discussed later in the Article, this distortion is not 
helped by open questions in federal preemption doctrine. 
Nevertheless, whatever disputes may be happening at the margins 
of federalism, one conclusion is clear: fraud remediation cannot be 
the only permissible basis for state action, and the fraud fallacy 
must be addressed. 
Concerns reach well beyond the bounds of intellectual 
property. The concepts embedded in the fraud fallacy are 
expressed in general terms. Thus, if the legal system does not rein 
in this jurisprudential approach, patent law could become the first 
                                            
3.  See, e.g., Blue Sky Laws, U.S. SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/bluesky.htm (last modified Oct. 14, 2014) (describing 
state laws that govern securities); S. GUY PUCCIO, CAL. DEP’T OF REAL ESTATE, 
DISCLOSURES IN REAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS (2005), available at 
http://www.dre.ca.gov/files/pdf/re6.pdf (describing California’s stringent real 
estate disclosure regulations); cases cited infra note 20 (exemplifying sales tactics 
courts have found to constitute improper pressure sales). 
4.  For discussions of intellectual property law in the context of respecting 
these federalism values, see Camilla Hrdy, Commercialization Awards, 2015 
WIS. L. REV. 13, 48, 58 (2015); Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property 
Clause’s Preemptive Effect in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON 
LAW 265, 279 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013); see also Gugliuzza, supra 
note 2, at 1605–06 (discussing the fact that states traditionally have played a role 
in disciplining abusive or improper assertion of legal rights); Ernest Young, Two 
Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1387 (2001) (noting that 
the states must be left with something to do). 
5.  See Young, Two Cheers, supra note 4, at 1387. 
6.  Young, Ordinary Diet, supra note 1, at 264. 
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of many areas in which states find themselves severely constrained. 
In that case, the role of the states in the federal union will have 
traveled a long way from any notions embodied in federalism. 
Section I of this Article discusses the modern patent demand 
business model, describing the emergence of that model, the 
extent of the activity, and examples of troubling behaviors. Section 
II traces the tangled path the lower courts have taken to arrive at 
the conclusion that a state’s ability to act is limited to fraud and 
bad faith. That path begins with a set of Supreme Court cases from 
the 1960s regarding a citizen’s First Amendment right to petition 
government without fear of antitrust liability. Known as the 
Noerr/Pennington cases, the cases hold that no antitrust liability 
can attach when one petitions the government, even if that petition 
would harm one’s competitors. The Noerr/Pennington cases 
embody the notion that antitrust law cannot be allowed to chill the 
exercise of one’s right to speak to the government.  
The Federal Circuit then applies Noerr’s rule regarding the 
limitations of federal antitrust law, extending the rule to create 
limitations on state laws that might affect patents. It is a particularly 
odd theoretical leap. Noerr can be understood as celebrating 
states’ rights, in essence finding that citizens should be able to tell 
their state legislatures how they want to be governed and that 
federal law should stay out of the way. Thus, it is ironic that the 
Federal Circuit dispatches Noerr to serve the opposite master—that 
is, preventing states from responding to their citizens’ concerns. 
Most importantly, missing from the Federal Circuit’s logic is the 
Supreme Court’s focus on the chilling effect that antitrust’s treble 
damages might have on one’s ardor for speaking to the sovereign. 
Such treble damages concerns do not apply in the patent realm. 
In addition to stretching the Noerr line of cases, the Federal 
Circuit supports its preemption decisions with a series of thin and 
shaky patent cases. The series begins with a breathtakingly short 
decision from the early years of the Federal Circuit’s existence—a 
ruling noting simply that a patent holder has the right to threaten 
infringers with a lawsuit.
7
 While the statement is undoubtedly true, 
it does not answer the question of the limits to which a patent 
holder may go in enforcing those rights, not to mention whether a 
state can regulate such actions. With only slightly more analysis 
and support, the Federal Circuit then declared that patent holder 
demands cannot be challenged unless those demands are in bad 
                                            
7.  See Concrete Unlimited Inc. v. Cementcraft, Inc., 776 F.2d 1537, 1539 
(Fed. Cir. 1985). 
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faith—defined as whether the speaker believes in the truth of the 
statement. From these shaky foundations, the Federal Circuit 
constructed a rule that states are preempted from regulating any 
patent demand behavior unless that behavior is both objectively 
and subjectively baseless. 
If the Federal Circuit’s logic is weak and without basis, 
however, how should patent preemption apply in these 
circumstances? After all, patent law is a federal scheme, and it 
cannot be true that states are free to rummage around in 
everything related to patents. Section III of the Article examines 
these issues under Supreme Court preemption doctrine, both as 
the doctrine applies to intellectual property and to other areas of 
law. The section concludes that state law cannot be entirely 
displaced simply because a particular commercial behavior relates 
to patents.  
Understanding the interplay between federal and state power 
related to patent demands requires an understanding of the 
commercial and economic context in which patent rights exist. 
The granting of patents in the federal Patent Act relies upon and 
presupposes a functioning state system of commerce and contract 
law. Without this, inventors would be unable to form the 
commercial relationships and licensing transactions necessary to 
bring their ideas to fruition. The maintenance of conduct within 
such systems is the proper domain of the state. Moreover, as noted 
above, commerce, contract, and consumer laws traditionally are 
viewed as appropriate for experimentation across state jurisdictions 
and appropriate forums for reflecting local values. Thus, Section III 
explains that states must have some space in which they can 
express local preferences in relation to the business of patent 
demands. 
Section III also explores a theme that bubbles up through a 
number of modern Supreme Court decisions. Although not clearly 
articulated in the language of the cases, it provides a useful lens for 
making sense out of preemption cases in general and patent 
preemption in particular. One can call the concept “heart and 
periphery.” Specifically, a state law that goes to the heart of federal 
legislation is more likely to be problematic; a state law that affects 
the periphery is more likely to be accepted. Section III explains 
how the heart/periphery concept differs from the familiar 
“congressional purpose” test in preemption analysis and describes 
how the two concepts play out in modern cases.   
Applying this analysis to the Patent Act, issues such as validity, 
infringement, and procedures for challenging a patent lie at the 
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heart of the federal scheme. Thus, a state’s ability to establish its 
own rules related to these areas is more likely to be preempted. In 
contrast, issues such as notice requirements, transparency, 
protection against pressure sales tactics, basic contract principles, 
and others stand at the periphery, and states should have breathing 
space to establish their own dictates.  
The most important point in Section III, however, is the 
following: in moving through preemption analysis, none of the 
possible approaches for analyzing a state’s proper role would 
suggest that a state should be limited to policing fraud and bad 
faith. That notion seems to be spun out of thin air. 
I. THE MODERN PATENT ASSERTION BUSINESS MODEL 
The rapid expansion of the non-practicing entity business 
model has created challenges for courts and legislatures alike. In 
the esoteric lingo of patent law, the term “non-practicing entity” 
refers to a business that does not make products from the 
inventions named in their patents. Rather, non-practicing entities 
hold patents for the purpose of asserting them against companies 
that do make products, on the grounds that those products are 
infringing. 
No one wants to be labeled a patent troll.8 Thus, there has 
been much skirmishing over terms and definitions, with various 
groups trying to ensure that the definition can be trimmed so that 
they fall outside of it. Points of debate include whether the relevant 
term should include those who buy patents as well as those who 
were originally granted the patents. Should it include trusts and 
individuals as well as corporations and partnerships? Should it 
include only those who sue companies or also those who make 
patent demands under the threat of transferring to those who will 
sue? Do we call them NPEs, PAEs, PMEs, or simply trolls?  
Although the debate is endlessly interesting, both from an 
academic and a political perspective,9 this Article uses a simple 
and broad notion: non-practicing entities are those who assert 
patents as their core business activity. This Article also uses the 
                                            
8.  Robin Feldman, Patent Demands & Startup Companies: The View 
From the Venture Capital Community, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 236, 244 (2014) 
(“[N]o one wants to be branded a bad guy, and if patent trolls are bad guys, 
everyone wants the definition to point somewhere else.”). 
9. See id. at 244–54 (discussing the various terms used and their 
implications). 
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term most commonly found in the literature, NPE, despite its 
resemblance to alphabet soup. 
NPE activity has risen significantly over the last decade. The 
number of patent lawsuits has more than doubled since 2007, with 
much of the increase from lawsuits by NPEs.10 The increase in 
litigation activity by NPEs can be measured both in terms of the 
lawsuits filed and in terms of the number of defendants sued. 
Although the amount of patent litigation declined in 2014 following 
key Supreme Court decisions,11 lawsuit filings are still far above 
2007 levels, before the modern increase began, and far above 
levels going back for twenty years.12 In addition, despite the recent 
Supreme Court decisions, new NPEs and new models of NPE 
activity continue to blossom. One private study concluded that 143 
new NPEs filed patent lawsuits in 2014.13 Although different studies 
focus on different segments of the data, the results are remarkably 
consistent across similar measures.14 The amount of litigation 
activity from NPEs has risen substantially since 2007. 
                                            
10.  See Robin Feldman, Tom Ewing & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500 
Expanded: The Effects of Patent Monetization Entities, 17 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 
42 (2013); see also Matthew Sag, IP Litigation in United States District Courts: 
1994 to 2014, 101 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 17) (on file 
with the Iowa Law Review), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2570803 (finding that patent litigation volume 
doubled from 2010 to 2013). 
11.  See Robin Feldman, Theme of Restraint in Term’s IP Cases, DAILY 
JOURNAL (July 8, 2014) https://www.dailyjournal.com/public/ 
pubmain.cfm?logout=&seloption=&eid=&vid=&CFID=8088329&CFTOKEN=234
29742 (describing key Supreme Court decisions in 2014). 
12.  See Feldman et al., Monetization Entities, supra note 10, at 42 
(showing that the number of patent lawsuits rose from 2,512 in 2007 to 5,038 in 
2012, using data from PACER, EDIS, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
website, and district court websites); see also Sag, supra note 10, at 19 tbl.3 
(reporting the number of patent cases as 1,555 in 1994, 2,883 in 2007, 5,620 in 
2012, and 5,368 in 2014, using data from Bloomberg Law and closely matching 
the PACER data); id. at 17 fig.4 (demonstrating that while the number of patent 
lawsuits doubled in the 16 years between 1994 and 2010, they doubled again 
between 2010 and 2013). 
13.  RPX, 2014 NPE LITIGATION REPORT 6 (2015), available at  
http://www.rpxcorp.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/03/RPX_Litigation-
Report-2014_FNL_040615.pdf. 
14.  Variation between studies generally depends on definitional choices 
made by researchers. For example, using a sample of 500 patent infringement 
cases, Jeruss, Feldman & Walker found that the proportion of lawsuits filed by 
NPEs increased from 22% of cases in 2007 to almost 40% of cases in 2011. See 
Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman & Joshua Walker, The America Invents Act 500: 
Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. 
REV. 357, 377 (2012). Meanwhile, using the same sample, the nonpartisan 
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Modern patent demand behavior frequently is based on 
exploiting the costs and risks of litigation to extract a settlement, 
rather than on the value of the patent. With two million patents 
outstanding, serious concerns about patent quality,15 and patent 
litigation defense costs often reaching well into the millions of 
dollars, a rational company may choose to settle a patent demand, 
                                            
Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the proportion rose from 
17% in 2007 to only 24% in 2011. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT 
PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 
17 (2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657103.pdf. The majority of 
the difference can be explained by the GAO’s choice not to include individuals 
and trusts as potential NPEs, choosing instead to focus only on entities organized 
as corporations and partnerships. For a more detailed discussion on the choice 
of who to include as a potential patent monetizer, see Feldman et al., 
Monetization Entities, supra note 10, at 4–6. Cotropia, Kesan, and Schwartz 
(CKS) criticize the AIA 500 studies and conclude that “the often-repeated 
‘explosion’ of PAE litigation from 2010 to 2012 is almost completely a myth” by 
asserting that the number of alleged infringers and defendants did not increase 
from 2010 to 2012. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L. 
Schwartz, Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. 649, 
655 (2014). However, CKS examine only litigation in 2010 and 2012 for their 
study. By 2010, the increase in assertion activity was already well underway. 
While it is certainly true that changes to joinder rules from the America Invents 
Act contributed to the increase in the number of lawsuits filed in 2011 and 
beyond, Feldman, Ewing & Jeruss (FEJ) show that the number of defendants 
sued by monetizers has climbed substantially over time, from 1,814 in 2008 to 
6,244 in 2011 and 4,606 in 2012. See Feldman et al., Monetization Entities, supra 
note 10, at 44. Considering that the number of defendants has climbed 
substantially despite AIA rules making it harder for multiple defendants to be 
added to a patent infringement lawsuit, these results suggest an increase in total 
litigation activity. Further, the CKS data for 2012 is not significantly different 
from that of FEJ. FEJ found that 58.7% of cases in 2012 were filed by monetizers, 
while CKS, who combined “large aggregators, patent holding companies, and 
individuals” to define PAEs, found that 51.5% of cases were filed by PAEs. Also, 
per calculations by CKS, FEJ found that 49.9% of alleged infringers in patent 
cases were involved in monetizer suits in 2012. Using their definition of PAE, 
CKS concluded this percentage was 46.9% in their study. See Cotropia et al., 
supra, at 692 tbl.2 & 692–94. 
15. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 28–32 
(detailing how many stakeholders believe some patents “have unclear property 
rights and make overly broad claims”); COLLEEN V. CHIEN, NEW AM. FOUND., 
OPEN TECH. INST., PATENT ASSERTION AND STARTUP INNOVATION 15 (2013), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2321340 (reporting similar beliefs among 
survey respondents); Shawn P. Miller, Where’s the Innovation: An Analysis of 
the Quantity and Qualities of Anticipated and Obvious Patents, 18 VA. J.L. & 
TECH. 1, 6–7 (2013) (estimating that up to 39% of software patents and 56% of 
business method patents could be found at least partially invalid, compared to 
28% of all patents). 
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even if the patent is weak or if the company is unlikely to be 
infringing the patent. NPEs have become adept at pointing out the 
costs and risks of challenging a patent demand in comparison to 
the ease of purchasing a license.   
Large-scale, generalizable information on the impact of NPEs 
on innovation is difficult to come by. Nevertheless, the results of 
small sample studies are not encouraging. These observations have 
included troubling impacts NPEs have had on startups,16 a lack of 
markers of innovation from NPE licensing,17 losses to businesses 
due to NPE demands,18 and additional suggestions of negative 
impacts on innovation.19 Other literature has reported pressure 
sales tactics and disturbing behaviors, sometimes aimed at small 
businesses or individuals.20 
                                            
16.  See, e.g., Feldman, Patent Demands, supra note 8, at 263–67 (finding 
that 70% of venture capitalists have experienced patent demands against a 
portfolio company, with 59% of the venture capitalists reporting that all or most 
of these demands were launched by NPEs); CHIEN, PATENT ASSERTION, supra 
note 15, at 10–11 (reporting that 75% of venture capitalists had received an NPE 
demand against a company in their portfolio); see also Colleen V. Chien, 
Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461, 472–78 (2014) (detailing 
the costs and impacts of NPE demands on startups and small companies). 
17.  See Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Do Patent Licensing 
Demands Mean Innovation? (Feb. 15, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the Iowa Law Review), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2565292 (finding that NPE licenses rarely lead to 
technology transfer). 
18.  See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE 
Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387, 408 & tbl.4 (2014) (estimating the direct 
aggregate cost of NPE patent assertions to U.S. companies to be $29 billion in 
2011). 
19.  See, e.g., Catherine Tucker, Patent Trolls and Technology Diffusion 
(TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2012-030, 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2136955 (finding that sales of 
a firm’s medical imaging software dropped by one-third during litigation, relative 
to the firm’s products not covered by the litigated patents, and attributing this 
drop to the lack of new product releases and stalled innovation among sued 
companies); see also EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT 
ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 9–10 (June 2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf (discussing 
the Tucker study and other evidence of costs to innovation); Fiona M. Scott 
Morton & Carl Shapiro, Strategic Patent Acquisitions, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 463, 
482 (2014) (applying the “leaky bucket” concept to NPE demands to explain 
how little revenue earned by NPEs is actually returned to original patentees, and 
citing Bessen & Meurer, supra note 18, at 423, who find that only 20% of 
payments to NPEs flows back to inventors or to research and development at 
NPEs). 
20.  See, e.g., Robin Feldman & Tom Ewing, The Giants Among Us, 2012 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 30–31 (2012) (giving the example of a mass aggregator 
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Much attention has focused on the impact of lawsuits and 
litigation reform. Nevertheless, reports suggest that 90% of patent 
demand activity never reaches the litigation stage. This activity 
takes place largely outside the purview of the courts or other 
sovereign authority.21 Such business approaches can be as simple 
                                            
using escalating pressure to push companies to become “members” of the 
aggregator); Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & 
FIN. 250, 273–298 (2013) (detailing numerous examples of troubling schemes); 
Assurance of Discontinuance (No. 14-015), In the Matter of the Investigation by 
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, of MPHJ 
Technology Investments, LLC 2–8 (assurance filed January 13, 2014), available 
at http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/FINALAODMPHJ.pdf (announcing a settlement 
against an NPE accused of deceptive tactics, such as: sending nearly identical 
patent demands to hundreds of New York companies, falsely claiming that other 
businesses had already entered into licensing agreements, conveying the 
misleading “impression . . . that an outside attorney had conducting a 
meaningful review of the facts and circumstances of [each business] alleged 
infringement,” and creating hundreds of subsidiaries with “cryptic names” to 
make “it more difficult to find information about the Company and the 
Company’s licensing program”); Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Patent 
Demands and Initial Public Offerings, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2015) (manuscript at 55) (on file with the Stanford Technology Law Review), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2591648 (finding evidence of companies 
receiving patent demands shortly before or after their initial public offering). For 
examples of sales techniques that courts have found to constitute improper 
pressure sales tactics in areas outside of patent law, see Brown v. Kerkhoff, 279 
F.R.D. 479 (S.D. Iowa 2012) (pressuring patients into paying for treatment 
upfront in exchange for discount); M & T Mortg. Corp. v. Miller, 323 F. Supp. 
2d 405, 413 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (abbreviated two-day sales contract period); 
Niemiec v. Kellmark Corp., 581 N.Y.S.2d 569, 570–71 (Tonawada City Ct. 
1992) (persistent telephone solicitation and requirement of immediate decision 
on “once in a lifetime offer”); National Housewares, Inc., 90 F.T.C. 512, 568–569 
(1977) (fast-talking sales pitch which does not give customer chance to think 
about real purpose of sales presentation or object to it); State ex rel. Celebrezze 
v. Consumer's Edge, Inc., No. 90CVH04-2646 1990 WL 677012, at *3 (Ohio 
C.P. Oct. 1, 1990) (techniques that result in the customer's inability to 
understand, review, and inspect the entire contract with care before signing); see 
also Mass. Office of the Attorney Gen., 1993 REP. OF THE ATTN’Y GEN. 83 
(discussing the successful conclusion of a case in 1992, titled Commonwealth v. 
Greatex of Mass., Inc., which included tactics such as telling the consumer the 
price would increase significantly if a contract was not signed immediately). 
21.  Robin Feldman, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 39 (2012) (“Throughout all 
of the bargaining that a patent holder faces during the life of the patent, it is 
important to note that only some of the process will involve the sovereign’s 
active participation. Although judicial proceedings, agency reexaminations, and 
even legislative changes will involve the sovereign’s participation in one of its 
various forms, much of the process will take place outside the sovereign’s 
purview. For some crucial junctures, such as the exchange of exploratory letters, 
licensing negotiations, and internal decisions of what to defend and what to 
abandon, the sovereign may not participate at all.”).  
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as a call or letter saying, for example, “I have patents; you are 
infringing them; it will cost $1–6 million in legal fees if you try to 
fight; lots of people have taken licenses from me, so let’s just be 
reasonable and work this out. Oh, and if you want any details, you 
must sign a nondisclosure agreement.” 
A number of states have begun reviewing this activity in the 
context of their business or consumer protection codes,22 and one 
could imagine a variety of categories that might be applicable to 
the NPE business model. Potential laws could include transparency 
requirements, such as the requirement to identify who the party 
asserting the patent is and what patent claims are being asserted. 
Other types of transparency considerations could include a 
requirement to identify entities that the patent holder is related to 
so the target could determine if it already holds a license from a 
related entity.23 With the proliferation of non-disclosure agreements 
and complex structures, targeted businesses and individual at times 
have been unable to find even the most basic information, making 
it difficult to challenge the patent or to know whether they already 
hold a license.24 For example, the New York Attorney General’s 
                                            
22.  See Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringements, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
9, §§ 4195–4199 (West, Westlaw through 2013–2014 Sess.) (delineating factors 
that courts can consider as evidence of bad faith assertions of patent 
infringement, and creating remedies and enforcement policies, making it the first 
state to pass legislation against patent trolling). Since the passage of the Vermont 
act, at least 17 other states have passed similar legislation, many of which are 
nearly identical to the Vermont act. See, e.g., Actions for Bad Faith Assertion of 
Patent Infringement, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, §§ 8701–8702 (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 ch. 1); Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringement, VA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 59.1-215.1–59.1-215.4 (West, Westlaw through 2015 ch. 1); Patent 
Infringement Claims, MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 416.650–416.658 (West, Westlaw 
through 2014 Sess.). Bills have been introduced in numerous other states. Patent 
Progress’s Guide to State Patent Legislation, PATENT PROGRESS (last visited Mar. 
24, 2014), http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patent-
progresss-guide-state-patent-legislation/.  
23.  For an example of the problems target companies can encounter 
without such information, see Summit Data Systems v. EMC Corp., Civil Action 
No. 10-749-GMS, 2014 WL 4955689, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 2014), aff’d sub 
nom. Summit Data Systems v. NetApp Inc., No. 2015-1103, 2015 WL 5894214, 
at *1 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 9, 2015) (large NPE collected settlements from five end-user 
companies, ranging from $60,000 to $170,000 each, despite the fact that these 
companies were covered by a license between the NPE and a third party).  
24.  See, e.g., Feldman & Ewing, The Giants Among Us, supra note 20, at 
39–40 (describing how a company called Xilinx had several parties dismissed 
from its declaratory judgment action against a mass aggregator because Xilinx 
could not “identify the formal [patent] owner among a group of extremely 
related parties,” all members of the aggregator’s “network of affiliated shell 
companies”). 
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office recently reached a settlement with an NPE, finding, among 
other allegations, that the NPE had created hundreds of 
subsidiaries for patent assertion activity, with cryptic names like 
“CalNeb” and “JabTre” that made it difficult for targeted 
businesses to discover any information about the company.25 
Further, targets were required to sign non-disclosure agreements 
before they were provided with basic information about the patents 
in question.26 Other requirements might address notice issues, for 
example, what is the target company doing that might be infringing 
the patent. Still others could be designed to curtail pressure sales 
tactics or to include information about relevant state offices. 
Regardless of the merits of any particular requirement, the 
underlying question remains: does a state have the power to say, 
“if one wishes to engage in this type of business in our state, here 
are the basic requirements one must abide by?”  
II. THE RISE OF THE FRAUD FALLACY 
In examining a state’s power to regulate the business of patent 
assertion, lower courts have concluded that states are limited to the 
remediation of active fraud or sham activity. The development of 
this approach has occurred primarily at the Federal Circuit,27 but 
other courts have followed suit.28  
In particular, the Federal Circuit has ruled that any behavior 
involving a patent is governed by federal law and is not a matter of 
state law.29 From this general rule, the Federal Circuit carved out a 
                                            
25.  See Assurance of Discontinuance (No. 14-015), Attorney General of 
the State of New York, supra note 20, at 2. 
26.  Id. at 7. 
27.  See, e.g., GP Indus. v. Eran Indus., 500 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). 
28.  Activision TV, Inc. v. Pinnacle Bancorp, Inc., No. 8:13CV215, 2014 
WL 197808, at *3 (D. Neb. Jan. 14, 2014); In re Innovatio IP Ventures, 921 F. 
Supp. 2d 903, at *912 (N.D. Ill. 2013); cf. Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-
Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding that patent 
holders are not subject to personal jurisdiction for declaratory judgment actions 
based on demand letters); Integrity Mgmt. of Fla., LLC. v. Dental Websmith, 
Inc., No. 4:08CV3079, 2008 WL 4372878, at *5 (D. Neb. Sept. 19, 2008) (same); 
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Schumann, 474 F. Supp. 2d 758, 762 (M.D.N.C. 
2006) (same); Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 375, 429–30 (2014) (discussing the implications of the Federal 
Circuit’s Red Wing decision and the decisions that have followed). 
29.  See, e.g., Mikohn Gaming Corp. v. Acres Gaming, Inc., 165 F.3d 891, 
896 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[D]etermination of the propriety of [the patent holder’s] 
actions in giving notice of its patent rights is governed by federal statute and 
precedent and is not a matter of state tort law.”). 
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narrow exception covering when patent holders engage in fraud 
before the patent office or otherwise engage in “bad faith” 
behavior.30 Specifically, the Circuit has ruled that “the protection 
otherwise afforded by the patent laws to a patentee’s conduct in 
enforcing its patent may be lost if the patentee acts in bad faith.”31 
As will be described below, this is an odd way to think about 
preemption, particularly Patent Act preemption. Nevertheless, the 
Federal Circuit maintains this rule, even borrowing from antitrust 
law to establish a high bar for bad faith. Those who wish to show 
that a patent holder has acted in bad faith must demonstrate that 
the party’s behavior satisfies the bad faith threshold both 
subjectively and objectively.32 
Other courts have followed the Federal Circuit’s lead. Consider 
Activision v. Pinnacle, a procedurally complex case in the federal 
district court of Nebraska.33 The Nebraska Attorney General’s 
                                            
30.  See Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., Inc., 362 F.3d 
1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[S]tate law claims such as [the plaintiff’s] can 
survive federal preemption only to the extent that those claims are based on a 
showing of ‘bad faith’ action in asserting infringement.”); Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. 
Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that bad faith is a 
prerequisite for the state-law tortious interference claim and that without a 
showing of bad faith, the claim is preempted by patent law); Hunter Douglas, 
Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding 
that federal law preempts state law regarding publicizing a patent in the 
marketplace “unless the plaintiff can show that the patentholder acted in bad 
faith”) overruled in part on other grounds by Midwest Indus., 175 F.3d 1356, 
1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 
710 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[I]nfringement notices have been enjoined when the 
patentee acted in bad faith, for example by making threats without intending to 
file suit.”). 
31.  Zenith, 182 F.3d at 1343. 
32.  See Globetrotter, 362 F.3d at 1368 (finding that the state law suit 
related to actions outside of litigation failed because the plaintiff did not establish 
that the patent holder’s actions were objectively baseless and referencing 
requirements that the statements must be subjectively baseless). 
33.  Activision TV, Inc. v. Pinnacle Bancorp, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (D. 
Neb. 2013). The procedural complexity flows from the fact that the Nebraska 
Attorney General first issued the cease and desist orders to Activision’s 
attorneys, a firm with a reputation for representing non-practicing entities in 
patent demand letter campaigns and which had sent the demand letters in 
question. See Memorandum and Order 31, Activision TV, Inc. v. Pinnacle 
Bancorp, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (D. Neb. 2013) (8:13CV00215) (clarifying 
that Nebraska’s cease and desist order related only to demand letters and 
concluding that the attorneys could represent the Activision in any lawsuit 
activity). The court later allowed the patent holder itself, Activision, to enter the 
case and issued a preliminary injunction against the Nebraska Attorney General 
and in favor of Activision and its attorneys. See Activision TV, Inc. v. Pinnacle 
Bancorp, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (D. Neb. 2013). Referencing the same logic, 
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Office had opened investigations and issued cease and desist 
orders against particular patent holders and their attorneys related 
to demand letter activity. In briefing on the case, the Attorney 
General, among other arguments, cited Supreme Court precedent 
holding that unfairness is broader in scope than deception and 
explained that common features of unfair practices include 
coercive, high pressure sales and collection tactics.34 The Attorney 
General went on to describe such tactics by the patent holders.35 
Additional concerns expressed by other state Attorneys General 
offices in similar cases include demand letters with little 
information on either the identity of the patent holder, the 
allegedly infringing activity, or the patents at issue so that recipients 
cannot find sufficient information to file an action to prove non-
infringement.36 This has been a problem for companies both large 
and small.37 Regardless of whether the sender evidenced 
fraudulent or bad faith intent, the effect on those receiving the 
letters is the same and echoes the types of concerns that are 
typically raised in state laws related to commercial practices.  
                                            
the court later allowed another patent holder, MPHJ, to enter the suit, and 
extended the preliminary injunction to cover current actions by Nebraska 
against MPHJ and any future actions by the state against either Activision or 
MPHJ. See Activision TV, Inc. v. Pinnacle Bancorp, Inc., No. 8:13CV215, 2014 
WL 197808 (D. Neb. Jan. 14, 2014). The 8
th
 Circuit then granted the patent 
holder’s request to transfer the appeal to the Federal Circuit, a decision that 
stands somewhat in tension with a District Court opinion in a case involving the 
Attorney General of Vermont. Compare Activision TV, Inc. v. Pinnacle 
Bancorp, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (D. Neb. 2013) (8th Cir. 13-03374)with State 
of Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Investments, 763 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(mandamus petition to prevent district court from remanding patent demand 
letter case to state court rejected by the Federal Circuit panel for lack of 
jurisdiction in which district court had ruled that the case rested on Vermont 
state law and that federal patent law issues are not necessarily raised).  
34.  See Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 
and for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 21–23, Activision TV, Inc. v. Pinnacle 
Bancorp, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (D. Neb. 2013) (8:13CV00215) (citing FTC 
v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972)). 
35.  See id. 
36.  See, e.g., Testimony of Vt. Att’y Gen. William H. Sorrell Before the 
United States House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade, (April 8, 2014), 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20140408/102105/HHRG-113-IF17-Wstate-
SorrellW-20140408.pdf. 
37.  See Order Re: Motions To Enjoin, Dismiss And/Or Transfer, Xilinx v. 
Invention Investment Fund I LP, No. 11-CV-0671 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2011) 
(describing the dismissal of Xilinx’s declaratory judgment action of non-
infringement because Xilinx had named the wrong shell company in its papers).  
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Nevertheless, in the Nebraska case, the trial court rejected 
Nebraska’s arguments, issuing a series of preliminary injunctions 
that prevented the Attorney General’s Office from enforcing its 
orders. The trial court concluded that any state action against 
demand letters is preempted unless there is a showing of bad faith. 
The allegations of unfair and deceptive practices apparently were 
insufficient. The court also ruled that Nebraska’s orders operated 
as an improper prior restraint on speech, in violation of the First 
Amendment. District courts in at least four other states have 
echoed the bad faith requirement.38  
Since 2013, more than 20 states have either passed legislation 
related to patent holder behavior or have used existing legislation 
to fight inappropriate patent holder behavior in their states.39 
Sensing the winds, these state legislators and attorneys general on 
the whole have attempted to carefully circumscribe their actions to 
conform to the fraud and bad faith requirements. Thus, the 
Federal Circuit’s pronouncements have had a profound effect on 
the shape of state law and state behavior throughout the nation.  
A. Setting the Stage: The Supreme Court’s Antitrust Immunity Cases 
The bad faith requirement flows from an over-extension of 
doctrines that have now been stretched well beyond the breaking 
point. Beginning with Supreme Court case law concerning the 
                                            
38.  See, e.g., In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation, 921 
F.Supp.2d 903, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Clearplay, Inc. v. Nissim Corp., No. 07-
81170-CIV, 2011 WL 3878363, at *7–8 (D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2011); DeSena v. Beekley 
Corp, 729 F.Supp.2d 375, 401 (D.Me. 2010); Alien Tech. Corp., v. Intermec, 
Inc., No. 3:06-CV-51, 2008 WL 504527, at *4 (D.N.D. Feb. 20, 2008).   
39.  Patent Progress’s Guide to State Patent Legislation, PATENT PROGRESS, 
http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patent-progresss-
guide-state-patent-legislation/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2014). See, e.g., Bad Faith 
Assertions of Patent Infringements, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195–4199 (West, 
Westlaw through 2015–2016 Legis. Sess.) (delineating factors that courts can 
consider as evidence of bad faith assertions of patent infringement, and creating 
remedies and enforcement policies, making it the first state to pass legislation 
against patent trolling). See also Assurance of Discontinuance (No. 14-015), 
supra note 20. In many other states, the acts signed into law are nearly identical 
to the Vermont legislation. See, e.g., Actions for Bad Faith Assertion of Patent 
Infringement, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, §§ 8701–8702 (West, Westlaw through 
2015); Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringement, VA. CODE ANN. tit. 59.1, §§ 
59.1-215.1–59.1-215.4 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); Patent 
Infringement Claims, MO. ANN. STAT., tit. 26, §§ 416.650–416.658 (West, 
Westlaw through 2014 Sess.). For a detailed description of the provisions of 
these pieces of legislation, see Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Preemption, 
101 VA. L. REV. 1579 (2015).  
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right to petition government to pass legislation, the Federal Circuit 
eventually concludes that states may not pass any laws related to 
patent demands, outside the realm of fraud or sham. As the 
Federal Circuit spins this out, the doctrines become more and 
more attenuated from the Supreme Court’s original concern about 
chilling one’s ability to speak to the legislature. 
The trail begins with a set of Supreme Court antitrust decisions 
from the 1960s regarding the First Amendment right to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances. This right is enshrined in 
the First Amendment: “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; 
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or of the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances.”40 In case law commonly 
known as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the Justices created a 
general antitrust immunity for those who petition the government. 
Specifically, parties are immune from antitrust liability for engaging 
in conduct aimed at influencing governmental decision-making.  
First, in construing the Sherman & Clayton Antitrust Acts in 
Noerr Motor Freight, the Justices rejected an antitrust suit brought 
against railroad industries for their campaign to prevent the 
Pennsylvania legislature from passing a measure related to 
permitting heavier trucking loads.41 The Justices stressed the right 
of the people to inform representatives of their wishes regarding 
passage or enforcement of laws, even in the hopes that such laws 
may disadvantage their competitors in ways that fall “far short of 
the ethical standards generally approved in this country.”42 
The opinion reflected the Supreme Court’s deep concern that 
the Sherman Antitrust Act should not be permitted to interfere 
with the right of the people to engage in representative democracy. 
With soaring language, the Justices noted that the three branches 
of government act on behalf of the people and that “the whole 
                                            
40.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
41.  See Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight 
Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). The railroads responded with their own antitrust 
counterclaims against the trucking industry for the legislative fight, which were 
denied by a lower court and not appealed. Id. at 145. 
42.  See id. at 139–140 (finding that “[t]he right of the people to inform 
their representatives in government of their desires with respect to the passage or 
enforcement of laws cannot properly be made to depend upon their intent in 
doing so. It is neither unusual nor illegal for people to seek action on laws in the 
hope that they may bring about an advantage to themselves and a disadvantage 
to their competitors”). 
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concept of representation depends upon the ability of the people 
to make their wishes known to their representatives.”43  
Thus, although the Federal Circuit would eventually enlist this 
opinion to prevent states from enacting patent demand legislation 
at the behest of their populations, the Noerr opinion did the 
opposite. In Noerr, the Supreme Court championed the ability of 
state governments to respond to the desires of their citizens and 
rejected attempts to stifle that process through a piece of federal 
legislation. 
In the decade after Noerr, the Supreme Court expanded the 
range of activities protected from antitrust liability. In United Mine 
Workers v. Pennington, the Supreme Court extended the 
protection to include attempts to influence regulatory officials, 
specifically, the Secretary of Labor in the context of labor and 
wage negotiations.44 In the California Motor Transport case, the 
Court extended antitrust immunity to include appeals to the courts, 
as well as to regulatory bodies and legislatures.45 
Having firmly established the notion of antitrust immunity for 
petitioning the government, the Supreme Court in 1993 tackled the 
tricky question of when that antitrust immunity might be lost.46 In 
the original case in this series, Noerr, the Justices had left the door 
open a crack for a hypothetical way in which immunity from 
antitrust action could be forfeited. The opinion commented that, 
There may be situations in which a publicity campaign, 
ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, 
is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than 
an attempt to interfere directly with the business 
relationships of a competitor and the application of the 
Sherman Act would be justified. But this certainly is not the 
case here. No one denies that the railroads were making a 
                                            
43.  Id. at 137. The Justices also emphasized the difference between 
regulation of business activity and the regulation of political activity, noting that 
nothing in the Sherman Act’s legislative history suggested an intent to regulate 
the political arena. See id. 
44.  See United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 
(1965). 
45.  See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 
(1972). 
46.  See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indust., Inc., 
508 U.S. 49 (1993). 
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genuine effort to influence legislation and law enforcement 
practices.47 
The language offered no more than a hint, and a puzzling one 
at that. How could an attempt to influence legislation not be an 
attempt to influence legislation, and how would one show that?  
Nevertheless, the Justices allowed a sham allegation to go 
forward in the California Motor Transport case. The Justices found 
the allegation that the defendants had not “sought to influence 
public officials” to be sufficient.48 Rather, the Justices concluded 
that the defendants sought “to bar their competitors from 
meaningful access to adjudicatory tribunals and so to usurp that 
decision-making process” instituting proceedings and actions “with 
or without probable cause, and regardless of the merits of the 
case.”49  
Two decades later, the Supreme Court did its best to slam the 
door, expressing frustration that the lower courts had defined sham 
“in inconsistent and contradictory ways.”50 The Justices described 
as “prescient” an earlier observation that the term sham might 
become “no more than a label courts could apply to activity they 
deem unworthy of antitrust immunity.”51 In light of these concerns, 
the Justices in Professional Real Estate set a high bar for 
demonstrating sham activity for the purposes of an antitrust case. 
Specifically, one must demonstrate that the defendant’s 
anticompetitive activity was a sham, from both an objective and 
subjective standpoint.52 This antitrust case became the peg on 
which the lower courts would hang their modern patent 
preemption jurisprudence. 
B. Lower Courts Import Antitrust Case Law into Patent Preemption 
As described above, the Supreme Court set a high bar for what 
constitutes sham activity that is sufficient to bring an antitrust claim. 
The Federal Circuit took this notion and ran with it at full speed. 
As the Federal Circuit has stretched out the doctrine, however, it 
                                            
47.  Eastern Railroad Presidents v. Noerr, 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961). 
48.  Cal. Motor Transp. v. Trucking, 404 U.S. at 511–512 (internal 
quotation mark omitted). 
49.  Id. at 512. 
50.  Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indust., Inc., 508 
U.S. at 55.  
51.  Id. at 55 (citing Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, 486 U.S. 
492, 508 (1988)). 
52.  Id. at 57. 
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became more and more attenuated from the context of antitrust’s 
treble damages and the Supreme Court’s original concern that the 
threat of such liability could chill one’s ardor for speaking to the 
legislature. This progression will be traced through a series of 
Federal Circuit cases below. 
In addition to stretching the Noerr doctrine, the Federal 
Circuit’s line of cases presses into service several patent law 
notions, related to federal preemption and appropriate patent 
demand behavior, that rest on extremely shaky foundations. The 
series of cases begins with a short Federal Circuit decision from the 
early years of that court’s existence.53 In the 1985 case of Concrete 
Unlimited v. Cement,54 the Federal Circuit began by agreeing with 
the trial court that the patent was invalid as obvious over the prior 
art. The court then rejected claims related to what the trial court 
had deemed “threats and infringement actions based on the 
fraudulently obtained patent.”55 The Federal Circuit’s decision 
offered little discussion, noting simply that a patent holder has the 
right to enforce its patent, and that Concrete merely did what any 
patent owner has the right to do, including threatening infringers 
with suit.  
The fact that a patent holder has the right to enforce its patent 
and to threaten infringers with a lawsuit is clearly true. That simple 
statement, however, does not answer the question of the limits to 
which a patent holder may go in enforcing those rights. 
With little more analysis than the declaration in Concrete, the 
Federal Circuit declared a decade later that demands from patent 
holders cannot be challenged as long as they are promulgated in 
good faith. The good faith requirement was added without 
elaboration in Mallinckrodt, a case that has been overruled sub 
silencio by the Supreme Court on other grounds.56  
The cases cited in Mallinckrodt provided scant support for 
such a sweeping generalization. In addition to citing the cursory 
declaration in Concrete, which said nothing about good faith, 
Mallinckrodt cited language from an older Supreme Court case,57 
                                            
53.  The Federal Circuit was promulgated by the Federal Courts 
Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) which 
amended 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-51). 
54.  Concrete Unlimited Inc. v. Cementcraft, Inc., 776 F.2d 1537 (1985). 
55.  See id. at 1538. 
56.  Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 701 (Fed. Cir. 1992), 
abrogated by Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008). See 
Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575, 585 
(E.D. Ky. 2009). 
57.  See Mallinckrodt v. Medipart, 976 F.2d at 709–710. 
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which also did not support the new rule. Specifically, in 1913, the 
Supreme Court considered antitrust claims against a patent holder 
in Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co.58 The case included an 
allegation that certain lawsuits were part of a larger antitrust 
scheme.59 The Justices noted that it would take something more 
than simply filing a lawsuit to create illegality, and stressed that the 
claims in the case involved an antitrust action seeking treble 
damages: 
Patents would be of little value if infringers of them could 
not be notified of the consequences of infringement, or 
proceeded against in the courts. Such action, considered by 
itself, cannot be said to be illegal. Patent rights, it is true, 
may be asserted in malicious prosecutions as other rights, 
or asserted rights, may be. But this is not an action for 
malicious prosecution. It is an action under the Sherman 
antitrust act for the violation of the provisions of that act, 
seeking treble damages. (emphasis added).60 
Thus, the Justices in Virtue Creamery certainly did not suggest 
that bad faith should be the only basis to challenge a patent 
lawsuit, and in fact, did not mention bad faith at all. Nevertheless, 
the Federal Circuit elevated the simple statement that filing a 
patent lawsuit by itself is not actionable, to a blanket rule that no 
patent demand activity of any kind is actionable unless the activity 
is in bad faith.61 
The Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt also referenced an older 
Second Circuit case, which did not directly conclude that bad faith 
is the only basis for challenging patent demands.62 The Second 
Circuit case concerned an actual finding of bad faith from the trial 
court, on an allegation that the patent holder sent threats to sue 
despite never intending to file a lawsuit. In an opinion focused on 
the meaning of bad faith, the Second Circuit rejected the trial 
evidence, particularly the trial court’s failure to appropriately 
                                            
58.  See Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 227 U.S. 8 (1913). 
59.  Id. at 37. 
60.  Id. at 37–38 (emphasis added). 
61.  And, of course, Virtue v. Creamery was an antitrust case, with the 
special considerations that such cases entail. See id. 
62.  See Mallinckrodt v. Medipart, 976 F.2d at 710 (citing Kaplan v. 
Helenhart Novelty Corp., 182 F.2d 311, 314 (2d Cir. 1950) (citing Kelly v. 
Ypsilanti Dress-Stay Mfg. Co, 44 F. 19 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1890))). 
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consider the patent holder’s explanation for never filing suit.63 
Thus, the Second Circuit opinion concerned the meaning of bad 
faith but never directly stated that bad faith is the only basis for 
challenging patent demands. Moreover, in providing support for its 
holding, the Second Circuit opinion cited an 1890 case implying 
that bad faith would not be the only basis for a challenge. The 
Circuit Court decision from Michigan, Kelly v. Ypsilanti, 
considered a libel suit against a patent holder for sending letters to 
a potential infringer’s customers.64 Among other reasons for 
rejecting the claim, the court noted that the language of the notices 
was “perfectly respectful and courteous” and “nothing . . . to which 
the person receiving it can take a just exception.”65 The court also 
noted that there was undoubtedly authority for granting an 
injunction “if the language of such letters or circulars be false, 
malicious, offensive, or opprobrious, or used for the willful 
purpose of inflicting an injury.” While one could argue that false 
circulars would be in bad faith—in the sense of being made up of 
baseless assertions66—offensive or opprobrious ones certainly would 
not. Even the notion of “used for the willful purpose of inflicting 
injury” would not clearly fall within the definition of bad faith. In 
other words, contrary to the Federal Circuit’s Mallinckrodt 
opinion, the Ypsilanti court noted that there are a variety of bases 
for challenging patent demands. On thin reeds such as these, 
however, the Federal Circuit moved forward with its 
pronouncement that demands from patent holders cannot be 
challenged, as long as the demands are promulgated in good faith.  
The old cases cited in Mallinckrodt were part of a line of 
federal cases originating in the 1880s in which courts exercised 
their powers of equity to enjoin inappropriate patent holder 
behavior.67 The decisions frequently focused on concerns about 
threats and intimidation, for example, noting that “acts of 
intimidation should fall within the preventive reach of a court of 
equity” and that while those in business avoid lawsuits of any kind, 
patent suits are so far outside of people’s knowledge base that they 
                                            
63.  See Kaplan v. Helenhart Novelty Corp, 182 F.2d 311, 313–314 (2d Cir. 
1950). 
64.  See Kelly v. Ypsilanti Dress-Stay Mfg. Co, 44 F. 19 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 
1890). The case was decided by the predecessor court to the 6
th
 Circuit. 
65.  Id. at 23. 
66.  See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Preemption, 101 VA. L. REV. 
1579 (2015) (explaining that while good faith takes on different meanings in 
different contexts, good faith in patent enforcement has traditionally referred to 
whether the speaker sincerely believed in the truth of the statement). 
67.  See Gugliuzza, supra note 39, at 35–37 (describing these cases). 
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are “terrorized by even the threat of such a suit.”68 The concerns 
about preventing intimidation echo across time, but one might 
suspect that the analysis of which behaviors raise intimidation 
concerns would benefit from being updated a century later. 
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit fixated on the behaviors that 
emerged in these cases, and the notion that evidence of bad faith is 
the only basis upon which patent holder behavior can be 
restrained. 
Most importantly, these early cases did not seem to 
contemplate whether the good faith rule arose as a matter of 
federal law or state law, let alone whether preemption might come 
into play. Although both state and federal law claims were raised 
in the cases at times, the decisions were simply discussed in general 
terms of what one does with a patent. Nevertheless, the Federal 
Circuit used these cases to move another step toward its 
pronouncement that demands from patent holders cannot be 
challenged, as long as the demands are promulgated in good 
faith.69 
C. Wrapping the Weak “Bad Faith” Decisions into a Patent Preemption 
Doctrine 
The preemption notion would grow out of another set of 
Federal Circuit decisions. In the 1991 case of Abbott Labs v. 
Brennan, the Federal Circuit considered whether state law 
remedies might be available for improper behavior at the Patent & 
Trademark Office during the patent application process.70 
                                            
68.  See Emach v. Kane, 34 F. 46, 50, 52 (N.D. Ill. 1888). 
69.  A later Federal Circuit case citing this line of logic would cite Section 
287 of the Patent Act as further support. See Mikhon Gaming Corp. v. Acres 
Gaming, Inc. 165 F.3d 891, 897 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[p]atentee has the right to 
inform a potential infringer of the existence of the patent . . . [t]he statute 
contemplates such notice. See 35 U.S.C. Section 287.”). Section 287 allows 
patent holders to mark their goods to provide notice that the good is covered by 
a particular patent and specifies that a patent holder may not recover damages 
unless the patent holder notified the infringer in one of a variety of methods and 
the infringement continued. It is certainly true that the statute contemplates and 
even requires notice to potential infringers. Federal authorization of notice, 
however, does not answer the question of whether certain behavior in the 
context of notice might violate state statutes. 
70.  See Abbott Labs. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Getting 
lost in bad faith is understandable. A number of the cases that arose during this 
period were based on claims that required an allegation of bad faith, such as 
inequitable conduct. Nevertheless, although bad faith may be a key to certain 
type of claims, no logic suggests that bad faith behavior should be the only basis 
upon which a state may act. 
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Declining to opine about administrative proceedings in general, the 
court ruled on what it described as the narrow question: “whether 
the state tort action for abuse of process can be invoked as a 
remedy for inequitable or other unsavory conduct of parties to 
proceedings in the Patent & Trademark Office.”71 The court 
declined to allow a state law remedy, concluding that the process 
of granting a patent falls within the purview of federal law.  
Without discussing potential differences between antitrust and 
patent statutes, the Abbott court referenced the Noerr line of cases. 
It concluded from Noerr that no state law abuse of process claim 
could arise for activity at the Patent & Trademark Office, unless 
“the entire federal agency action was a ‘sham.’”72  
The question of whether there can be a state remedy for 
misbehavior at a federal agency raises particular preemption 
complications.73 Nevertheless, through a series of cases in 1998–
1999, the Federal Circuit combined its patent law “bad faith” 
rulings with its preemption decisions regarding state law claims for 
actions at the federal patent office to create an awkward, bifurcated 
rule. Specifically, the Federal Circuit ruled that any state law claims 
related to patent holder conduct in obtaining or publicizing a 
patent are preempted unless 1) the patent holder engaged in fraud 
before the patent office or 2) the patent was publicized in bad 
faith.74 
The Federal Circuit is no stranger to promulgating awkward 
rules and tests in its patent jurisprudence that have been later 
rejected by the Supreme Court. In particular, the odd, bifurcated 
rule described above is reminiscent of the now discredited 
“machine-or-transformation” test, which arose in the Federal 
                                            
71.  Id. at 1355. 
72.  See id. at 1356. 
73.  In fact, a Federal Circuit panel a few years later would distinguish 
Abbott, holding that a state law claim for intentional interference with 
contractual relationships based on patent demand activity is not preempted by 
federal law. See Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp, 139, F.3d 1470, 1472, 1477 
(Fed. Cir. 1998). 
74.  See Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 
1336–1337 (Fed. Cir. 1998), overruled by Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan 
Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir 1999). For a case that applies the 
“publicizing in bad faith” prong, characterizing this prong as required by 
preemption, see Mikohn Gaming Corp. v. Acres Gaming, Inc., 165 F.3d 891, 
896 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“National uniformity, in confluence with the national scope 
of the patent grant and the general federal exclusivity in patent causes, require 
that determination of the propriety of Acres’ actions in giving notice of its patent 
rights is governed by federal statute and precedent and is not a matter of state 
tort law.”). 
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Circuit at the same time.75 With the machine-or-transformation 
rule, the Federal Circuit held that a process satisfies patentable 
subject matter if 1) it is tied to a particular machine, or 2) it 
transforms a particular article into a different state.76 The machine-
or-transformation rule was not well received when it reached the 
Supreme Court. In a quartet of cases, the Supreme Court would 
first note that the machine-or-transformation test could not be the 
sole test (although it might offer an important and useful clue),77 
and would eventually jettison the test entirely, focusing on the 
underlying concepts from which the Federal Circuit had tried to 
construct the rule.78 As the Justices noted, nothing in the ordinary 
meaning of the statutory authority “would require [inventions 
either] to be tied to a machine or to transform an article.”79 
The discredited machine-or-transformation test and the odd 
bifurcated preemption test suffer from the same flaws. The 
problem lies in forgetting that such “tests” are merely a proxy for 
the underlying concepts.80 It is not that everything embodied in the 
test is wrong, or that the notion of developing a proxy is wrong, the 
problem lies in allowing the proxy to take on a life of its own, 
                                            
75.  See Robin Feldman, A Conversation on Judicial Decision-Making, 5 
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 21 (2013) (the “Federal Circuit [ ] derive[d] the 
requirement that all process patents must constitute either a machine or 
transformation” from the Supreme Court’s decision in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 
U.S. 63 (1972)). See also FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW, supra note 21, at 
91–135. 
76.  See, e.g., State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, 
Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 
943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
77.  See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 659 (2010) (“Adopting the 
machine-or-transformation test as the sole test for what constitutes a ‘process’ (as 
opposed to just an important and useful clue) violates these statutory 
interpretation principles.”). 
78.  See id. at 601–02, 606–09; Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus 
Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293–94 (2012); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2107, 2116–17 (2013); Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. 
CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354–55 (2014); see also Robin Feldman, 
Coming of Age for the Federal Circuit, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 27, 32 [hereinafter 
Coming of Age] (discussing the Supreme Court’s patentable subject matter test 
of first determining whether the patent is directed to one of several ineligible 
categories, such as an abstract idea, and second, looking at any additional 
elements in the claim to see if the core of what is new, “the inventive concept” 
adds enough). 
79.  See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. at 617.  
80.  See Feldman, Coming of Age, supra note 78, at 33; see also Mayo v. 
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1303 (noting that the exceptions to patentable subject 
matter serve as a “proxy for the underlying ‘building-block’ concern”).  
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disembodied from the underlying concepts.81 With both of these 
tests, the Federal Circuit picked out isolated elements, constructing 
a test as if these were the sole examples, rather than developing a 
test that embodied the entirety of the underlying concept. 
To its credit in these cases, the Federal Circuit does identify 
key issues in a preemption analysis and notes the importance of 
the role that states play in regulating contracts and business 
behavior. For example, the Federal Circuit explains that 
commercial contracts traditionally are the domain of state law,82 
and it waxes poetic on the notion that “[i]t is difficult to fathom 
how such a state law cause of action could have any discernible 
effect on the incentive to invent, the full disclosure of ideas, or the 
principle that ideas in the public domain remain in the public 
domain.”83 Nevertheless, at the end of the day, the Federal Circuit 
chooses its odd bifurcated test, in which state law is preempted 
unless the patent holder engaged in fraud before the patent office 
or the patent was publicized in bad faith.84 
D. Importing the Supreme Court’s Antitrust Test into the Bad Faith Patent 
Preemption Rule 
From this shaky foundation, the Federal Circuit builds an even 
weaker construct by importing the Supreme Court’s test for 
petitioning the government in antitrust cases into patent demand 
notices. As described above, the Justices in Professional Real Estate 
set a high bar for demonstrating sham activity for the purposes of 
an antitrust claim.85 In choosing to apply the antitrust standard to 
patent cases, the Federal Circuit observed that a number of circuits 
had applied this high bar, not just to antitrust cases regarding 
petitioning the legislature—the original Noerr circumstances—and 
not just to antitrust cases involving litigation—the Professional Real 
                                            
81.  See Feldman, Coming of Age, supra note 78, at 33. 
82.  Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (citing Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 44 U.S. 257, 262 (1979)); see 
also Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1334 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998) (noting in the context of field preemption that “Title 35 [the Patent 
Act] occupies the field of patent law, not commercial law between buyers and 
sellers” and that “the regulation of business affairs is traditionally a matter for 
state regulation”).  
83.  Dow v. Exxon, 139 F.3d at 1475 (referencing Kewanee Oil Co. v. 
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974)).  
84.  See Hunter Douglas v. Harmonic, 153 F.3d at 1336–37.  
85.  See supra text accompanying note 2 (explaining the requirement that 
one must demonstrate activity was a sham, both from an objective and from a 
subjective perspective, in antitrust cases). 
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Estate circumstances—but to antitrust activities involving demands 
outside of litigation.86 These cases rested on the logic that if a 
particular immunity from antitrust liability applies to filing lawsuits, 
then the same immunity should apply to threats to file patent 
lawsuits. After all, threats to file a lawsuit could eventually lead to a 
lawsuit. The problem with this logic, particularly in the context of 
patent demands, is that patent threats take place outside the 
purview of a judge. As such, they are not subject to the potential 
disciplining effect that judicial proceedings have the potential to 
bring.  
The Federal Circuit noted that these cases extending 
Professional Real Estate’s high bar almost exclusively involved 
antitrust liability.87 Nevertheless, the court ruled that this high bar 
should be applied to patent cases as well and to demand activity 
outside of litigation. Not finished yet, the Federal Circuit raised the 
bar even further by ruling that plaintiffs must establish bad faith by 
clear and convincing evidence, rather than by the lower standard 
of preponderance of the evidence.88 At the end of the day, the 
Federal Circuit cobbled together the following doctrine: all state 
laws relating to patent demand activity outside of litigation are 
preempted unless the activity in question is both objectively and 
subjectively baseless, a finding that must be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence.  
In creating this rule, the Federal Circuit has strayed far from 
the original concerns that animated the Supreme Court in Noerr.89 
Rather than protecting the right to petition the legislature from the 
chilling effect of antitrust’s treble damages, the doctrine has been 
stretched to protect behavior involving patent demands from 
regulation by the states.  
                                            
86.  See Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., Inc., 362 F.3d 
1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Coastal States Mktg., Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 
1358, 1367 (5th Cir. 1983); McGuire Oil Co. v. Mapco, Inc., 958 F.2d 1552, 1560 
n.12 (11th Cir. 1992); A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 263 F.3d 
239, 252–53 (3d Cir. 2001); Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 219 
F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 2000); Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 936–38 (9th 
Cir. 2006); In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 685–86 
(2d Cir. 2009); Philip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶¶ 205f–
g, at 302–10 (4th ed. 2013). But cf. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball 
Players Ass’n, 208 F.3d 885, 890–91 (10th Cir. 2000). 
87.  See Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., Inc., 362 F.3d 
at 1376.  
88.  See Golan v. Pingel, Ent. Inc., 310 F.3d 1360, 1371–73 (Fed. Cir. 2002); 
see also Gugliuzza, supra note 2, at 1625 (describing Golan).  
89.  See supra text accompanying notes 40–51 (describing Noerr). 
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In short, the Federal Circuit has enlisted Noerr to serve the 
opposite master of its original design. As described at the start of 
this section, Noerr can be understood as championing states’ rights. 
Citizens should be able to tell their state legislators how they want 
to be governed, and the federal government should stay out of the 
way. Ignoring this, the Federal Circuit has dispatched Noerr to 
suppress states’ rights, eventually concluding that federal law 
preempts almost any state law related to behavior involving patent 
demands. Throughout this journey, the Federal Circuit has lost its 
way, jumbling questions together and sliding from one concept to 
another, without the strong foundation that can support enduring 
doctrinal analysis. 
E. How Should One Analyze Whether Noerr Applies to Patent Demands 
Outside of Litigation? 
If the Federal Circuit is wrong, however, how should one 
analyze whether Noerr or other federal doctrines apply to the 
issues at hand? The solution rests on a comparison of the original 
issues addressed in Noerr to the issues that arise with patent 
demands outside of litigation. 
Noerr concerned the question of whether a federal scheme—
embodied in the federal antitrust statutes—was being applied in a 
way that would interfere with the right to petition government. 
Over time, the line of cases at the Supreme Court level would 
consider whether application of the federal antitrust statutes was 
getting in the way of an approach to the legislature, an approach to 
regulatory bodies, and eventually, an approach to the courts.90   
In contrast, the question for demand letters concerns whether a 
state scheme could get in the way of an effort to vindicate rights 
granted under a federal scheme. Answering that question requires 
several layers. The first layer involves the rights that have been 
granted under the federal scheme. Perhaps the federal scheme 
itself preempts the type of state statute at issue? As described 
above, the Federal Circuit’s analysis of that question has been 
tremendously thin and weak. In addition, to the extent that the 
question relates to statutory preemption, such an analysis must rest 
on an examination of the Patent Act, not on a discussion of other 
federal schemes, such as the Noerr analysis of the antitrust statutes. 
Section III below will analyze preemption implications arising from 
the Patent Act. 
                                            
90.  The lower courts would extend the logic to encompass pre-suit 
communications as well. 
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  The second layer is the following: regardless of statutory 
preemption, does the state law violate the First Amendment right 
to petition government? This is a question of a different texture, 
but once again, the question must be grounded in an examination 
of the specific rights and regimes involved. In other words, is there 
something about the state statute that chills the patent holder’s right 
to petition government in a manner that rises to the level of a 
constitutional violation? In answering this question, it is helpful to 
look at the two other circumstances in which the Justices have 
applied the logic of Noerr outside of antitrust. 
The Supreme Court has used the Noerr logic by analogy in 
two other circumstances, one related to labor activity and one 
related to civil rights boycott activity. In each of these two cases, 
along with Noerr itself, the Court carefully examined the legislative 
schemes involved, as well as any special burdens or considerations 
that were relevant to potentially chilling the right to petition 
government. In the Noerr line of cases, the concern over the 
chilling effect revolved around antitrust’s harsh threat of treble 
damages, and whether application of that federal scheme was 
interfering with the right to petition government. In NAACP v. 
Claiborne,91 the Court extended Noerr immunity to protect 
nonviolent boycotting activities. The NAACP case involved a state 
law tort claim for malicious interference with business relationships 
in light of the boycott activity.92 Thus, the question was whether 
state tort law, as applied in this circumstance, interfered with the 
right to petition government for political change. Although the 
boycott activity did not directly petition the legislators, the boycott 
clearly was aimed at encouraging political change, a core First 
Amendment concern.93 As the Justices noted, the case implicated 
the special recognition afforded a federal constitutional 
amendment and in particular, the importance of Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.94  
The final case, Bill Johnson’s Restaurants v. NLRB,95 operated 
as a vindication of the importance of state interests, particularly a 
state’s ability to provide a civil remedy for conduct touching on 
                                            
91.  See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
92.  Id. at 892. 
93.  See Buckley v. Am. Const. Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 186 (1999) 
(finding that core political speech, such as petition circulation, “involves 
‘interactive communication concerning political change’ . . . [and] First 
Amendment protection for such interaction [ ] is ‘at its zenith.’”) (citing Meyer v. 
Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422, 425 (1988)). 
94.  See id. at 914–15. 
95.  Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983).   
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issues deeply rooted in local sentiment. The case involved an 
attempt by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to enjoin a 
suit by an employer in state court. The NLRB argued that filing the 
state court suit was an act of retaliation for protected labor 
activities. The Justices allowed the state lawsuit to go forward, 
ruling that “a well-founded lawsuit may not be enjoined as an 
unfair labor practice, even if it would not have been commenced 
but for the plaintiff’s desire to retaliate against the defendant for 
exercising rights protected by the Act.”96 Delving deeply into the 
Labor Act and the Court’s accompanying jurisprudence, the 
Justices stressed that in light of the “recognition of the States’ 
compelling interest in the maintenance of domestic peace,” the 
Court had “repeatedly construed the Act as not preempting the 
States from providing a civil remedy for conduct touching interests 
‘deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility.’”97 Thus, in Bill 
Johnson’s Restaurant, the Supreme Court did not allow a federal 
scheme to enjoin recourse to the courts, showing particular 
concern for a state’s ability to respond to behavior that implicates 
local concerns.  
Thus, the two circumstances in which the Supreme Court has 
extended Noerr outside of antitrust do not provide much hope for 
a similar extension in the case of patent demands. As a general 
matter, the Court has carefully examined the legislative schemes 
involved, along with any special burdens or considerations, and 
the Justices have shown particular concern for a state’s ability to 
respond to local concerns, even in the face of federal schemes. 
In addition, Noerr and its Supreme Court progeny are 
specifically focused on potentially chilling the right to petition 
government in the form of an appeal to the legislature or the 
courts. In contrast, the type of state patent troll legislation under 
consideration would not enjoin recourse to the legislature or the 
courts at all. Patent holders would be free to file and litigate a 
patent lawsuit at any time, the course of which would be governed 
by the appropriate federal patent and civil litigation rules.98 Rather, 
the state statutes would relate entirely to activity outside of the 
courthouse. Such behavior takes place entirely outside the purview 
of the sovereign, making it much more susceptible to abuse.  
                                            
96.  See id. at 743. 
97.  See id. at 741. 
98.  Section 287 of the Patent Act provides that patent holders must give 
notice of their patent in order to recover damages. The statute specifies, 
however, that filing a lawsuit constitutes notice. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a). 
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To some extent, one could argue that the states are actually 
trying to protect access to the courts for those who receive patent 
demands. The chilling effect of a threat of treble damages is 
reversed in the case of patent law, given that a patent holder, 
sending a cease and desist order to a company, can threaten to 
impose the risk of treble damages. When settlement demands 
include pressure sales tactics,99 such tactics may have the effect of 
frightening an accused infringer away from trying to validate its 
rights in court—precisely the type of chilling effect that animates 
concerns over the right to petition government. Other approaches 
can confuse patent holders into thinking that they cannot vindicate 
themselves in court, or that it would be hopeless to try. A state 
statute, attempting to curb such tactics, for example, would align 
with First Amendment interests by protecting targets’ access to 
courts from the chilling tactics of NPEs. In contrast, a doctrine that 
severely limits a state’s rights to pass such legislation should raise 
First Amendment concerns over the right to petition government. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s rule in antitrust cases that 
activity is immunized unless it is both objectively and subjectively 
baseless is particularly inapt for patent law. Uncertainties about the 
boundaries of an individual patent and the meaning of each word 
within a patent are endemic to the patent system. One could argue 
that the uncertainty flows from inevitable elements in the patent 
system—for example, the fact that scientific innovation is rapidly 
changing, and that the words of a patent must constantly be 
compared to products that did not exist when the patent was 
                                            
99.  See Feldman & Ewing, The Giants Among Us, supra note 20, at 28–29 
(describing mass aggregator RPX’s notice to Kaspersky Labs “that RPX had 
acquired the patents in the lawsuit [against 22 other companies] and could 
release Kaspersky from the suit in exchange for a 3-year membership in RPX at 
a cost of $160,000 a year” and that “RPX could sell its patents to third parties to 
be used against non-RPX members”); see also id. at 26–29 (describing horizontal 
collusion and other anticompetitive tactics by mass aggregators). Customer 
letters provide a variation on this theme. Consider, for example, the letters sent 
to a competitor’s distributors and contractors in the GP Industries case. They 
accuse the competitor of engaging in mail fraud, interstate transportation of 
stolen property and an unlawful pattern of racketeering activity in violation of 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The letters 
conclude by noting that they are “intended to place you on notice that Eran 
Industries will consider naming your company as an additional defendant.” See 
GP Indus. Inc. v. Eran Indus. Inc., 500 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also 
RETHINKING PATENT LAW, supra note 21, at 63–64 (discussing that the Federal 
Circuit ruled that the behavior did not meet Professional Real Estate’s 
objectively baseless test) (citing GP Indus. v. Eran, 500 F.3d at 1374)).   
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drafted.100 One could also argue that the uncertainty flows from 
the way in which the modern patent system operates, through 
practice at the Patent & Trademark Office and custom among 
patent prosecutors.101 Regardless of the origin, the patent system 
provides so much room for argument over each word and each 
implication, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to establish that 
all of the patent holder’s arguments were completely baseless, even 
when a patent holder has lost every individual argument. This is 
the patent system, after all, in which the Federal Circuit once ruled 
that “a” can mean “more than one” unless the patent holder 
evidenced clear intent to limit the meaning of the word.102 It is also 
the patent system in which the Supreme Court recently held that a 
patent claim is acceptable if it is “reasonably certain,” rather than 
“insolubly ambiguous.”103 All of this uncertainty has the merry 
outcome of ensuring that a patent holder can almost always argue 
that a position might have been something more than baseless. 
Finally, the Justices have already demonstrated, in another 
context, that they are wary of extending antitrust’s objectively and 
subjectively baseless test to patent law. The Federal Circuit had 
borrowed that test from antitrust and applied it to determining 
under the Patent Act whether a case is so exceptional that it 
justifies a fee award. In last term’s Octane case, the Court rejected 
the Federal Circuit’s importation of the objectively and subjectively 
baseless test, noting “[t]he threat of antitrust liability (and the 
attendant treble damages) far more significantly chills the exercise 
of the right to petition than does the mere shifting of attorneys’ 
fees.”104 
                                            
100.  See RETHINKING PATENT LAW, supra note 21. 
101.  See id. at Chapter 2, How Modern Patents Operate. 
102.  See ROBIN FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW 178 (2009) (citing 
Baldwin Graphic Systems, Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 
2008)). 
103.  See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014). 
On remand, the Federal Circuit implied somewhat sarcastically that little has 
changed, noting “The Court has accordingly modified the standard by which 
lower courts examine allegedly ambiguous claims; we may now steer by the 
bright star of ‘reasonable certainty,’ rather than the unreliable compass of 
‘insoluble ambiguity.’” Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 783 F.3d 1374, 
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
104.  See Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
1749, 1757 (2014) (citations omitted). The extended quote without citations is the 
following: 
ICON argues that the dual requirement of ‘subjective bad faith’ and 
‘objective baselessness’ follows from this Court’s decision in Professional Real 
Estate Investors (PRE), which involved an exception to the Noerr-Pennington 
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In short, the type of careful analysis the Supreme Court has 
used when choosing to apply Noerr analysis would suggest that 
Noerr is inappropriate for these circumstances. In analyzing 
whether the First Amendment’s right to petition government 
should prevent states from regulating patent demands outside of 
lawsuits, the analysis falls in favor of the states. Without a careful 
analysis of this kind, however, the Federal Circuit has blithely 
applied Noerr. Weaving this together with its exceedingly thin 
preemption threads, the Federal Circuit has reached its conclusion 
that state laws regulating patent demand behavior outside of 
litigation are preempted unless the behavior is objectively and 
subjectively baseless. Other courts have followed suit, raising the 
concern that the doctrinal entanglement will spill over into other 
preemption analyses.105  
III. A PREEMPTION ANALYSIS 
As described above, on the basis of exceedingly limited 
analysis, the Federal Circuit has held that state statutes related to 
patent behavior are preempted unless the behavior is in bad faith. 
The fact that the analysis is weak, however, does not answer the 
question of what a full-blown preemption analysis might look like. 
After all, patent law is a federal scheme, and it cannot be that states 
are free to rummage around in everything related to patents. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court, in dicta, lists patent law in its litany 
of uniquely federal areas of regulation.106 Thus, what might be the 
                                            
doctrine of antitrust law. It does not . . . the Federal Circuit imported the PRE 
standard into § 285. But the PRE standard finds no roots in the text of § 285, 
and it makes little sense in the context of determining whether a case is so 
‘exceptional’ as to justify an award of attorney’s fees in patent litigation. The 
threat of antitrust liability (and the attendant treble damages) far more 
significantly chills the exercise of the right to petition than does the mere shifting 
of attorney’s fees. 
105.  See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 
903 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (rejecting case related to patent demand letters outside 
litigation); Activision TV, Inc. v. Pinnacle Bancorp, Inc., No. 8:13CV215, 2013 
WL 5963142 (D. Neb. Nov. 7, 2013) (blocking, on First Amendment grounds 
among others, Nebraska state attorney general actions to prevent a law firm 
from sending cease and desist patent letters).   
106.  See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1983 
(2011) (listing patent as example of an “area of dominant federal concern” in a 
case related to state business licensing requirements and immigration); see also 
POM Wonderful v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2239–40 (2014) (finding that 
the Lanham Act is integral in the federal regulation of misleading labels). 
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contours of state authority to regulate behavior that is in any way 
relates to patents? 
A. Preemption in General 
Understanding the relationship between the power of the states 
and the power of the federal government has been a complex 
challenge since the founding of the nation. Scholars have debated 
the nature of early conceptions of the federal government’s 
relationship to the states—with some arguing that early federalism 
involved separate spheres delineating the exclusive domains of 
federal and state authority,107 and others arguing that such dualism 
was no more than a rhetorical device that not followed in practice. 
The modern approach to the relationship between the states and 
the federal government, however, is undoubtedly one of 
concurrent and overlapping powers, with numerous state and 
federal regulatory programs existing in parallel.108 Using a very 
broad brush, one could say that the general approach today is that 
state law can coexist with federal law, unless there is a very good 
reason to the contrary. 
At the core of these issues, lies preemption. Preemption flows 
from the Supremacy clause of the Constitution, which holds that 
“[t]he Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme law of the 
land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, 
                                            
107.  Young, supra note 1; see also Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 322 
(1913) (noting that while “state and Nation [have] different spheres of jurisdiction 
[ ] it must be kept in mind that we are one people; and the powers reserved to 
the states and those conferred on the nations are adapted to be exercised, 
whether independently or concurrently, to promote the general welfare . . . .”); 
Ernest A. Young, The Puzzling Persistence of Dual Federalism, in FEDERALISM 
AND SUBSIDIARITY, 34–82 (2014); Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualism to 
Polyphony, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF 
FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 33, 42 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009). See 
generally Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 
(1950) (describing the transition from “dual federalism” to concurrent powers). 
Corwin refers to this as cooperative federalism, if you prefer to use his language. 
Id. at 19–21.   
108.  Numerous jurisprudential moments have left little doubt about the 
concurrent nature of federal and state powers. These include the arrival of 
Roosevelt’s New Deal, the increasing movement of the federal government into 
the role of a regulatory state, and the expansion of Congressional authority in 
the sphere of interstate commerce through a broadening conception of the 
Commerce Clause. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 106. On the state side, 
these involved transformation of the negative commerce clause doctrine—which 
had seriously constricted state power—into a nondiscrimination rule. See id. 
2015] THE FRAUD FALLACY 65 
anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary 
notwithstanding.”109 And although the federal-state relationship 
plays out in different doctrinal forums—including commerce clause 
and sovereign immunity analyses—preemption has occupied so 
critical a role in recent years, that one scholar has called 
preemption, “the most important issue in modern federalism.”110 
Despite its central role in modern debates—or perhaps because of 
it—preemption doctrine has suffered an avalanche of criticism.111 
Preemption generally comes in three forms, although courts 
and scholars argue about the areas of overlap between the three. 
These three forms are express preemption, field preemption, and 
conflict preemption.112 For express preemption, Congress must 
specify that it is exercising authority to preempt state law. Express 
preemption language, however, does not necessarily end the 
inquiry into whether a state is acting appropriately. In various 
cases, the Court’s analysis has shifted to examining the extent to 
which Congress intended to displace state law and the areas 
covered by the language.113  
On the flip side, express language is not the only way in which 
federal law may preempt state law. Federal law may still preempt 
state law if the “federal regulation [is] so pervasive as to make 
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room to supplement 
it.”114 As described in the 2015 Supreme Court decision of Oneok 
v. Learjet, field preemption occurs when Congress “intended to 
foreclose any state regulation in the area, irrespective of whether 
                                            
109.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
110.  See Garrick Pursley, Preemption in Congress, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 511, 
513 (2010); see also Young, supra note 1, at 254–55 (discussing Pursley’s 
comment and noting that although the reach of the commerce clause and state 
sovereign immunity may garner headlines, preemption constitutes the functional 
heart of the Court’s federalism). 
111.  See Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 
1, 2 (2013).  
112.  For a general discussion of preemption, see Jeanne C. Fromer, The 
Intellectual Property Clause’s Preemptive Effect, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND THE COMMON LAW 265, 279 (Shayamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2014); Mark 
A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property 
Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111 (1999). 
113.  See, e.g., Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008) (finding 
lack of preemption despite express language and noting that “[i]f a federal law 
contains an express pre-emption clause, it does not immediately end the inquiry 
because the question of the substance and scope of Congress’ displacement of 
state law still remains”). 
114.  PG&E v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 
190, 204 (1983) (citing Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 
152 (1982)).  
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state law is consistent or inconsistent with federal standards.”115 
The key battleground, however, occurs not with express or field 
preemption, but with the third area—conflict preemption. With 
conflict preemption, either “compliance with both federal and state 
regulations is a physical impossibility” or “state law ‘stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution’” of the federal 
scheme.116 Thus, the two brands of conflict preemption can be 
described as the “impossibility” type and the “obstacle” type. 
There are numerous modern disputes among the Justices 
regarding the proper analysis for conflict preemption, but in 
particular, Justice Thomas has maintained a consistent minority 
viewpoint that obstacle preemption is not a valid basis for ousting 
state authority.117 
Another area of confusion within federalism is a series of recent 
cases regarding the existence of a presumption against 
preemption—the so-called “Rice” rule.118 The issue flows from 
language in the 1933 case of Mintz v. Baldwin, in which the Court 
held that “[t]he purpose of Congress to supersede or exclude state 
action . . . is not lightly to be inferred. The intention so to do must 
definitely and clearly appear,” and the logic echoed 14 years later 
in the case of Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator.119 The Justices disagree 
                                            
115.  See Oneok v. Learjet, 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1595 (2015) (internal citation 
marks omitted). 
116.  See id.  
117.  See Oneok v. Learjet, 135 S. Ct. at 1603 (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part) (“I have doubts about the legitimacy of . . . defining the pre-empted field in 
light of the objectives of the Act.”) (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583, 594 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in judgment) (finding that the “Court’s entire body of ‘purposes and objectives’ 
pre-emption jurisprudence is inherently flawed” and is so removed from the 
statutory text that it is inconsistent with the Constitution); Hillman v. Maretta, 
133 S. Ct. 1943, 1955 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (same); 
Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., 562 U.S. 323, 340 (2011) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in judgment) (same); PLIVA v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2590 n.13 
(2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (explaining that in writing for the majority, 
Justice Thomas employed a “novel expansion of impossibility pre-emption”). 
See also Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000); Young, supra 
note 1, at 328, 328–32 (explaining Justice Thomas’ jurisprudence that 
impossibility is the only valid basis for finding conflict preemption and 
describing that jurisprudence in detail). 
118.  The Rice rule arises from the case of Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 
331 U.S. 218 (1947). 
119.  Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 350 (1933); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator, 
331 U.S. at 350. For in depth discussion of the development of the Rice rule and 
the variations and debates across time, see Young, supra note 1; Mary J. David, 
Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967, 971 
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vigorously over whether, and under what circumstances, a formal 
presumption exists. As the debate rages on, the modern inquiry 
has become somewhat circular, making it less useful as a 
principled basis for decision making. In particular, the rule in Rice 
is framed as a presumption against preempting state activity when 
Congress has legislated in an area that the states have traditionally 
occupied. Sometimes, however, the Court has inverted the notion, 
framing the question in terms of whether the area has a history of 
significant federal presence, rather than whether the area has a 
history of significant state presence.120 As commentators have 
noted, the inquiry largely depends on how you frame the question, 
rather than any principle one can hold onto. Consider the Whiting 
case from 2011.121 The case concerned a state business licensing 
statute that included provisions related to hiring undocumented 
workers. One could characterize the issue as relating to 
immigration—a traditional area of federal activity—or relating to 
business licensing—a traditional area of state concern.122 In an era 
of concurrent powers, the Rice rule risks becoming more of a 
justification for a decision than a basis for the decision. 
Interpreting the boundaries of legislation is always an 
enterprise fraught with difficulty. As I have discussed at length in 
the past, human nature and the structure of legal argument 
constantly drive law into new territory, as those wishing to escape 
the constraints of precedent reach for the open spaces, the 
interstices among those things that have been decided.123  
                                            
(2002); Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 
767, 787 (1994). 
120.  See U.S. v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 90, 108 (2000) (discussing “when the 
State regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal 
presence”) reviewed by Young, supra note 1, at 334 (describing the shift in 
Locke from discussing state presence to federal presence).  
121.  Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). 
122.  See Young, supra note 1, at 336; see generally Daryl J. Levinson, 
Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 1311 (2002). 
123.  See FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW, supra note 102, at 79–90 
(2009); see also Young, supra note 1, at 316–17 (stressing the importance of rules 
of statutory construction since “[a]ll new laws, though penned with the greatest 
skill and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as 
more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and 
ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications (quoting THE 
FEDERALIST No. 37, at 236 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cook ed., Wesleyan 
Univ. Press 1961) (1788))); cf. Feldman & Lemley, supra note 217, at 13–18 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Iowa Law Review) (arguing that the 
boundaries of a patent cannot be fully understood until the end of the patent 
term, when all questions about the patent that will be asked, have been asked). 
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Nevertheless, various themes and sensitivities emerge from the 
modern preemption case law. At a general level, these include a 
certain fidelity to what Congress has actually intended,124 although 
there are differing views on the meaning of silence.125 These also 
include sensitivity to courts supplanting congressional decision-
making. Thus, for example, modern case law would not allow 
courts to say what Congress would have decided, if it had thought 
about the issue.126 Similarly, there is an instinct to hold the 
legislators’ feet to the fire.127 Thus, one might try to avoid allowing 
Congress to shirk its duty by creating ambiguous language, leaving 
each side to argue in court that it won on the Hill,128 or failing to 
give notice to those on the Hill who would defend the states 
                                            
124.  See, e.g., New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield 
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995) (noting that preemption 
claims turn on congressional intent and, therefore, must begin with statutory 
construction); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“‘The purpose 
of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption case.” (quoting 
Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963))); see also PLIVA, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2590–91 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing the Rice rule and 
the Court’s history of requiring a “clear and a manifest purpose” to preempt); 
Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008) (“When the text of a pre-
emption clause is susceptible of more than one plausible reading, courts 
ordinarily ‘accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption’” (quoting Bates v. Dow 
Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005))). See also, e.g., Calvin Massey, 
“Joltin’ Joe Has Left and Gone Away”: The Vanishing Presumption Against 
Preemption, 66 ALB. L. REV. 759, 763 (2003) (arguing in a discussion of United 
States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000), that “[i]n the absence of a clear directive 
from Congress, the burden of proof of preemptive intent ought to be on those 
asserting such congressional intent” and showing that modern scholars echo the 
Supreme Court’s exhortation). 
125.  See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 546 (1992) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“To be sure, our jurisprudence 
abounds with rules of ‘plain statement,’ ‘clear statement,’ and ‘narrow 
construction’ designed variously to ensure that, absent unambiguous evidence of 
Congress's intent, extraordinary constitutional powers are not invoked, or 
important constitutional protections eliminated, or seemingly inequitable 
doctrines applied . . . . But none of those rules exists alongside a doctrine 
whereby the same result so prophylactically protected from careless explicit 
provision can be achieved by sheer implication, with no express statement of 
intent at all. That is the novel regime the Court constructs today.”). 
126.  Cf. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011) 
(noting that class arbitration was not envisioned when Congress passed the 
federal act in 1925 and that it is a relatively recent development). 
127.  See, e.g., PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2582 (“Congress and the FDA retain 
the authority to change the law and regulations if they so desire.”). 
128.  Cf. Young, supra note 4, at 1359 (noting that when a governmental 
actor seeks to blur responsibility, it is attempting to shift the political costs onto 
other governmental entities). 
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against Congressional intrusion.129 As one scholar has noted, “If 
our system of political checks is to rest on a foundation of popular 
loyalty, the people need to know when to get upset and at 
whom.”130 These are general and useful themes. 
All of these themes take place against a backdrop of 
concurrent powers. Numerous overlapping state and federal 
regimes exist. For example, states are allowed to impose additional 
notice requirements on the sale of securities.131 Similarly, banking 
operates under a dual system with chartering allowed at either the 
national or the state level. As the Treasury Department has noted: 
Commentators and state bank supervisors rightly assert, for 
example, that a separate system of state banks allows the 
states to serve as laboratories for innovation and change, 
not only in bank powers and structures, but also in the area 
of consumer protection. State supervisors also make what 
is, in effect, a “smaller is better” argument in favor of the 
attributes of state systems, lauding the physical proximity of 
state bank regulators to the institutions they supervise, 
suggesting that state banks have greater access to state 
regulators and that geographic proximity gives state 
regulators greater familiarity with the banks they oversee.132 
Although coexistence is not always peaceful nor are the 
boundaries crystal clear, the notion of such coexistence is deeply 
engrained. What would be outside the norm would be an area that 
is exclusively reserved to one or the other, particularly without 
express language in the relevant federal act delineating it as 
“federal only; states keep out.” 
                                            
129.  See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991) (noting the 
importance of not giving “the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere 
Congressional ambiguity”); see also Young, supra note 4, at 1359 (discussing the 
Gregory v. Ashcroft passage in the context of providing adequate notice to those 
in Congress who would defend the states).  
130.  Young, supra note 4, at 1360. 
131.  This is true even for offerings that were made exempt from so-called 
state “Blue Sky” laws in the 1996 National Securities Markets Improvement Act. 
See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 
§ 18(c)(2), 110 STAT. 3416, 3419 (1996). 
132.  OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, NATIONAL BANKS AND THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM 10 (2003) 
(internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ 
publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/national-banks-and-
the-dual-banking-system.pdf. 
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Into this pantheon of preemption jurisprudence comes patent 
law. The Constitution provides Congress the power to grant rights 
to inventors for limited times, in order to promote the progress of 
the useful arts.133 This power has been realized through various 
federal Patent Acts. As the Court has noted, “Patents are not given 
as favors, as was the case of monopolies given by the Tudor 
monarchs,” but are “meant to encourage invention.”134 The 
innovation benefit to society is the anchoring concept of the 
granting of patents. Throughout patent jurisprudence, the words of 
the Justices ring from a decision of more than 150 years old; in 
encouraging invention, “the rights and welfare of the community 
must be fairly dealt with and effectually guarded.”135 
In recent years, and particularly as the public debate about 
patent trolls has heated up, some commentators have begun calling 
patents “property rights,” while others argue against doing so.136 
                                            
133.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
134.  Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) (internal 
citations omitted). 
135.  Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 329 (1858); see also Woodbridge v. 
U.S., 263 U.S. 50, 61 (1923) (explaining that “[t]he public . . . is a most material 
party to, and should be duly considered in, every application for a patent, 
securing to the individual a monopoly for a limited time, in consideration for the 
exercise of his genius and skill,” so as to further the “large public policy to 
promote . . . science and the useful arts”); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 
1, 9 (1966) (“The patent monopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor 
his natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to 
bring forth new knowledge.”); Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–36 (1966) 
(“The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress 
for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public [and 
therefore, a patent] is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its 
successful conclusion.”); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 
(1974) (“The productive effort thereby fostered [by patent laws] will have a 
positive effect on society through the introduction of new products and 
processes of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of 
increased employment and better lives for our citizens.”). 
136.  See, e.g., Doug Schoen, Congress Must Act On Patent Reform, 
FORBES (May 21, 2015, 8:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougschoen/ 
2015/05/21/congress-must-act-on-patent-reform/ (“A patent is a property right 
granted through the [USPTO] to protect a specific invention and to prevent 
others from making, using, or selling that invention.”); Time to Fix Patents, THE 
ECONOMIST (Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21660522-
ideas-fuel-economy-todays-patent-systems-are-rotten-way-rewarding-them-time-fix 
(arguing that patents are not an absolute property right). For perspectives on the 
notion that patents were not historically treated as property rights, see, e.g., 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 58–59, 94–96 (2001) (explaining the 
historic view of patents and copyrights as special, limited monopolies); SIVA 
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From a constitutional perspective, the respect for real property 
evidenced in constitutional language and history is worlds apart 
from what is reflected in the Constitution’s intellectual property 
clause. The intellectual property clause gives Congress the power 
to grant rights for limited times in pursuit of a specific goal. This 
creation of a narrow public franchise for limited policy reasons 
stands in sharp contrast to the Framers’ conception of core private 
property rights, and the way in which those rights are treated in the 
Constitution. I use the term “franchise” with some trepidation, 
because it can be easily confused with the type of Tudor favors 
that the Founders clearly rejected.137 Nevertheless, in the language 
of constitutional history, the term “franchise” seems appropriate.  
Justices Thomas and Alito highlighted that patents are not core 
property rights in their 2015 dissent in the Teva case.138 The case 
                                            
VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS 23–24 (2001) (historic view 
of patents and copyrights as a necessary evil); Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the 
Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 567 (2007) (explaining the 
difference between “core” private rights and “privileges” or “franchises”); 
Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property 
Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 1 (2004) (arguing that the “propertization” of 
intellectual property has been a revolutionary change in the past generation); 
Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and 
Copyright Clause, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 909, 919 (2002) 
(describing founding perspectives of patents and copyrights as limited 
monopolies); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of 
Property, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 873, 895–904 (1997) (book review) (objecting to 
“propertization” of intellectual property and exploring property rhetoric in 
intellectual property policy debates); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual 
Property, and Free Riding, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1031, 1033 (2005) (noting that the 
modern “propertization” of intellectual property lies in a shift in terminology in 
which the descriptive term “intellectual property” takes hold). For an opposing 
viewpoint, in the context of the Constitution’s takings clause, see Adam Mossoff, 
Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of Patents 
Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 691 (2007) (asserting that patents 
were secured as constitutional private property in the nineteenth century); but 
see Shubha Ghosh, Toward a Theory of Regulatory Takings for Intellectual 
Property: The Path Left open After College Savings v. Florida Prepaid, 37 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 637, 667 (2000) (arguing that the takings clause can be applied to 
intellectual property or intangible property only by analogy); Thomas F. Cotter, 
Do Federal Uses of Intellectual Property Implicate the Fifth Amendment?, 50 
FLA. L. REV. 529, 529 (1998) (characterizing the law of takings in relation to 
intellectual property as a muddle). 
137.  See supra text accompanying note 134; see also Camilla A. Hrdy, State 
Patent Laws in the Age of Laissez Faire, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 54 (2013) 
(describing the Founders’ intent to avoid a patchwork of patent rights that were 
conditioned on state-specific terms and conditions). 
138.  Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831, 848 (2015) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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concerned an esoteric area of patent law, but the dissenting 
opinion included historic perspectives discussing the contrast 
between patents and property: 
The Anglo-American legal tradition has long distinguished 
between “core” private rights—including the traditional 
property rights represented by deeds—and other types of 
rights. These other rights [include] “privileges” or 
“franchises,” “which public authorities have created purely 
for reasons of public policy and which ha[ve] no 
counterpart in the Lockean state of nature. Notwithstanding 
a movement to recognize a core property right in 
inventions, the English common law placed patents 
squarely in the final category as franchises . . . .139 
As the text of the dissent explained further, our own “Framers 
adopted a similar scheme.”140 In other words, from a constitutional 
perspective, patent rights simply are not analogous to property 
rights. They are, however, government grants established by the 
federal Patent Act, which means that state statutes and common 
laws that intersect with patents should be analyzed under 
preemption doctrine. 
In approaching this question, it is tempting to grab hold of a set 
of messy cases related to preemption in intellectual property. 
These cases are from the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, with each 
decade representing one swing of the pendulum. Specifically, in 
the companion cases of Sears and Compco, the Court ruled that 
patent law preempted interpretations of two state statutes extending 
patent-like protection for copying articles that would not qualify for 
protection under the Patent Act.141 In both cases state unfair 
competition laws would have been interpreted to protect against 
copying lighting fixtures that did not qualify for patent protection. 
The Justices held that such an approach was preempted.  
In contrast, the Goldstein, Kewanee, and Aaronson cases 
allowed intellectual property protection under state statutes for 
articles that did not qualify for copyright or patent protection. In 
Goldstein, the Court upheld a state statute protecting against 
copying sound recordings, which were not protected under the 
                                            
139.  Id. at 848 n.2 (citations omitted) (quoting Caleb Nelson, Adjudication 
in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 567 (2007)). 
140.  Id. at 847. 
141.  Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232–33 (1964); 
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238–39 (1964). 
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Copyright Act.142 In Kewanee, the Court upheld a state statute 
protecting against misappropriation of trade secrets, including 
innovations that would not qualify for protection under the Patent 
Act.143 In Aronson, the Court upheld the application of state 
contract law to enforce royalty payments to a patent applicant after 
the application was rejected.144 In each of these cases, the Court 
found no preemption. 
Finally, in 1989, the Court swung back in the other direction in 
a case related to moldings for boat hulls. In Bonito Boats, the 
Court ruled that patent law preempted a state statute that forbid 
using a direct molding process to copy unpatented boat hulls.145    
Some of the language in the opinions, located at both ends of 
the pendular arc, is troubling for its largely unmoored policy 
analysis of whether the incentives created by the various state 
intellectual property schemes would be consistent with the 
incentives created by the federal scheme. At times, these analyses 
come perilously close to encouraging judges to substitute their own 
judgment for that of Congress. For example, in discussing the 
patent system’s emphasis on disclosure in Kewanee, the Court 
noted the following: 
[I]t is hard to see how the public would be benefited by 
disclosure of customer lists or advertising campaigns; in 
fact, keeping such items secret encourages businesses to 
initiate new and individualized plans of operation, and 
constructive competition results. This, in turn, leads to a 
greater variety of business methods than would otherwise 
be the case if privately developed marketing and other data 
were passed illicitly among firms involved in the same 
enterprise.146 
Such discussions threaten to encroach on the economic and 
policy choices adopted by Congress. Similarly, in Bonito Boats, the 
court focused on “the policies behind the patent system.”147 
Explaining why state trade secret protection was not preempted 
while boat hull protection was, the opinion expounded on the 
different incentives created, in a manner that seemed somewhat 
                                            
142.  Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 571 (1973). 
143.  Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479 (1974). 
144.  Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 266 (1979). 
145.  Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 
(1989). 
146.  Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 483.  
147.  Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156. 
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unmoored. Noting that the boat hull statute would be “eroding the 
general rule of free competition upon which the attractiveness of 
the federal patent bargain depends,”148 the opinion compared the 
incentive structures of the different state schemes: 
The protections of state trade secret law are most effective 
at the developmental stage, before a product has been 
marketed and the threat of reverse engineering becomes 
real. During this period, patentability will often be an 
uncertain prospect, and to a certain extent, the protection 
offered by trade secret law may “dovetail” with the 
incentives created by the federal patent monopoly. In 
contrast, under the Florida scheme, the would-be inventor 
is aware from the outset of his efforts that rights against the 
public are available regardless of his ability to satisfy the 
rigorous standards of patentability.149 
In discussing the Kewanee/Bonito Boats line of cases, one 
scholar noted that it represents a court’s own factual findings 
without the benefit of empirical studies. He further notes that this 
methodology leads to the “sort of conclusion [that] makes critics of 
Bonito Boats uneasy because they fear the Court will use this 
casual approach to strike down state laws merely on efficiency 
grounds.”
150
 In other words, regardless of whether the right result 
occurred in these cases, some of the analysis wanders widely. 
Bonito Boats also makes a muddle of the question of whether 
the Patent Act creates field preemption. As described above, field 
                                            
148.  Id. at 161. 
149.  Id. (citations omitted). At the end of the day, approval of state trade 
secret laws may have depended heavily on the fact that they have existed across 
time with tacit recognition by Congress. See id. at 166 (“The law of unfair 
competition and state trade secret law have coexisted harmoniously with federal 
patent protection for almost 200 years. . . .”). This cannot, however, explain 
Goldstein’s approval of state protection for then uncopyrightable sound 
recordings. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 576 (1973) (holding that, 
under the Constitution, the states have not relinquished all power to grant to 
authors “the exclusive Right to their respective Writings” and that until Congress 
takes further action, the California statute against piracy may be enforced). 
150.  Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual Property Law and the Economics of 
Preemption, 76 IOWA L. REV. 959, 978 (1991) (emphasis removed). Heald took 
comfort that although Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Bonito Boats “recommends 
economic analysis to determine the existence of direct conflicts with the 
mechanics of federal law, it does not authorize courts to use freewheeling 
findings of inefficiency in spite of the Court’s own use of sloppy ‘fact-finding’ in 
cases such as Kewanee.” Id. (emphasis removed). I find the logic in the line of 
cases less reassuring than Heald did. 
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preemption exists when the federal regulation is entirely pervasive, 
while conflict preemption exits either when it is impossible to 
comply with both the state and the federal scheme or when the 
state scheme stands as an obstacle to the federal one.151 Prior 
Supreme Court cases had suggested that field preemption does not 
exist for patent law. Specifically, the Sears opinion used language 
that evokes the notion of the state scheme creating an obstacle to 
the federal one, rather than field preemption language: “When 
state law touches upon the area of these federal statutes, it is 
‘familiar doctrine’ that the federal policy ‘may not be set at naught, 
or its benefits denied’ by the state law.”152 
Similarly, the Compco companion case used conflict 
preemption language, finding the state law was “in conflict with the 
federal patent laws” and that it would “interfere” with the 
intellectual property clause of the constitution and the 
implementing copyright and patent laws.153 Kewanee followed the 
same path: “[T]here is ‘neither such actual conflict between the two 
schemes of regulation that both cannot stand in the same area, nor 
evidence of a congressional design to pre-empt the field.’”154 
Likewise Aronson also specifically analyzed the question under 
conflict preemption: “In this as in other fields, the question of 
whether federal law pre-empts state law ‘involves a consideration of 
whether that law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”155 
                                            
151.  See supra text accompanying notes 97–101. 
152.  Sears, Roebuck & Co.v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) (quoting 
Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 173, 176 (1942)). 
153.  Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964). 
Citing the language in Sears, among other arguments, one scholar has suggested 
that the intellectual property clause of the Constitution should be considered a 
separate basis for preemption outside of the Supremacy Clause—one that would 
prevent states from extending protections for copyright holders beyond what is 
provided in the Copyright Act. See Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property 
Clause’s Preemptive Effect 8–9 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-71, 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2194755. She acknowledges, 
however, that language in the Goldstein opinion makes it unlikely that the Court 
will take such an approach; see also supra text accompanying notes 100–104 
(“Although some see the Supreme Court’s assertions as dicta that could be 
worked around in future cases, it is unlikely that the Court will soon come to see 
the IP clause as working on its own to preempt state laws.”) (citations omitted). 
154.  Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 494 (1974) (quoting 
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963)). 
155.  Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (quoting 
Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 479) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Bonito Boats, however, contained muddled language about 
whether field preemption applies to the Patent Act. Some of the 
language appears to specifically reject the notion that the Patent 
Act creates field preemption. For example, in discussing Sears and 
Compco, the Bonito Boats decision explains that at the “highest 
level of generality,” the two cases could be interpreted to mean 
that states “are completely disabled from offering any form of 
protection to articles or processes which fall within the broad scope 
of patentable subject matter.”156 The opinion then rejects such a 
broad interpretation, holding that “extrapolation of such a broad 
pre-emptive principle from Sears is inappropriate” given that 
opinion’s “implicit recognition that all state regulation of potentially 
patentable but unpatented subject matter is not ipso facto pre-
empted by the federal patent laws.”157 
Notwithstanding such conflict preemption language and 
analysis, Bonito Boats, concludes with language that invokes the 
classic field preemption analysis: 
[The state] thus enters a field of regulation which the patent 
laws have reserved to Congress. The patent statute’s careful 
balance between public right and private monopoly to 
promote certain creative activity is a “scheme of federal 
regulation . . . so pervasive as to make reasonable the 
inference that Congress left no room for the States to 
supplement it.”158 
Ultimately, however, Sears, Kewanee, and Bonito Boats are 
tangential at best in analyzing the preemptive effect of patent troll 
legislation because the cases concern efforts by the states to create 
protections—specifically for things that federal patent and copyright 
do not protect. The creation of state intellectual property 
protection schemes raises the tricky question of whether Congress 
intended that anything unprotected should be left in the public 
domain. Moreover, the fact that Congress created uniform patent 
and copyright acts prompts particular sensitivity when states try to 
impose their own, differing protections. In contrast, an effort to 
provide limits on the behavior in which patent holders may engage 
                                            
156.  Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 154 (1989) 
(citing Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 677 (1969)). 
157.  Id. Similar to Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 491, the Bonito Boats opinion also 
speaks of conflict and interference with the federal patent laws. See Bonito 
Boats, 489 U.S. at 160, 165. 
158.  Id. at 167 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 
(1947)). 
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implicates a different set of issues.159 When examining state activity 
related to adequacy of contracts, sales behavior, or consumer 
disclosure, for example, one would certainly ask whether federal 
legislation preempts state action—either because the federal 
legislation expressly preempts state activity or because the state 
activity improperly conflicts with the federal scheme. Nevertheless, 
analysis of these issues would delve into questions other than those 
that arise with state creation of additional schemes for the 
protection of inventions.   
Most importantly, despite the muddled language in Bonito 
Boats, conflict preemption is the more likely inquiry for issues 
related to patents. It would be difficult to square field preemption 
with cases upholding state trade secret law.160 In addition, the 
entire approach in Bonito Boats, both the policy analysis and the 
analysis of field preemption, follows a less particularized approach 
than preemption analysis in this millennium, which tends to be 
more precisely grounded in the words of the relevant statute.161 
                                            
159.  See Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013) (Supreme Court held that 
state court had jurisdiction even given arising under language).  
160.  Cf. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1068 (2013) (finding in a case 
related to a state court’s ability to hear a malpractice claim based on whether a 
patent would have been approved that “[a]s we recognized a century ago, ‘[t]he 
Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of all cases arising under the patent 
laws, but not of all questions in which a patent may be the subject-matter of the 
controversy’” (quoting New Marshall Engine Co. v. Marshall Engine Co., 223 
U.S. 473, 478 (1912))). 
161.  Compare Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 154 
(1989), with Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1970 
(2011) (grounding the discussion of the policy breadth in the wording of the 
statute), and AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Vincent Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 
(2011) (same). Even with the divided opinions, both the majority and the dissent 
go to great lengths to ground their analysis in the text. See Geier v. American 
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869–70 (2000) (finding that “[n]othing in the 
language of the saving clause suggests an intent to save state-law tort actions that 
conflict with federal regulations”); cf. id. at 900 n.16 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(finding textual basis in the statutory language that the “saving clause 
unquestionably limits, and possibly forecloses entirely, the pre-emptive effect 
that [federally promulgated] safety standards . . . have on common-law 
remedies”); Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591,1596, 1601 (pointing to 
§§ 1 and 5 of the Natural Gas Act to delineate the limited scope of FERC’s rate-
setting authority); cf. id. at 1604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding that § 717(d) of 
the Natural Gas Act “empowers the Commission to regulate ‘practices affecting 
wholesale rates’” and that “[n]othing in the Act suggests that States share power 
to regulate these practices”); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 232–33 
(2011) (noting that given the “well known triumvirate of ground for [products] 
liability,” there is no implied preemption for defective design where the statute 
expressly preserves the other two); cf. id. at 266 (finding that the majority’s 
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And, of course, if field preemption were the proper test, states 
would be completely preempted from acting in the realm. Even 
state laws related to fraud and bad faith would be beyond the 
scope of appropriate regulation. For these reasons, the more likely 
analysis is of the type evidenced in Aronson, in which the Court 
found that “state law is not displaced merely because the contract 
relates to intellectual property which may or may not be 
patentable.”162  
Once in the realm of concurrent powers, rather than total field 
preemption, there is much that would concern the states in the 
legitimate exercise of their authority. To begin with, the granting of 
patents in the Patent Act relies upon and presupposes a 
functioning state system of commerce and contract law. Without 
this, inventors would be unable to form the commercial 
relationships necessary to bring their ideas to fruition. A patent is 
not a prize or an award; it is an opportunity to try to garner a 
return by creating products from the ideas embodied in the patent 
and bringing those products to market for the benefit of society. 
Patent holders however, are not required to create the product 
themselves, and society may be better served if patent holders 
choose to license their patents to others, who can create products 
from the ideas and bring value for society. Forcing vertical 
integration—with one party required to engage in all aspects from 
idea to product design to production—is hardly the preferred 
approach for a well-functioning economy. Thus, the federal Patent 
Act is predicated on local legal systems for contracts and 
commerce.163 It is a classic case in which the federal and the state 
systems must work hand in hand, as opposed to a federal scheme 
that would be capable of regulating with sufficient particularity and 
would reign supreme. 
Certainly, parties should not be able to utilize state law to 
contract around the patent system.164 Nevertheless, when the 
federal scheme relies upon the functioning of an underlying state 
system, preemption of that state function should require at least a 
clear expression of federal intent. In those circumstances, in 
                                            
textual analysis ignores the Vaccine Act’s default rule to preserve state law 
under § 22(a), thereby preserving state-law design defect claims).  
162.  See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979). 
163.  Cf. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (“The structure and 
operation of the [Controlled Substances Act] presume and rely upon a 
functioning medical profession regulated under the States’ police powers.”). 
164.  See Brief for Professor Robin Feldman, et al. as Amici Curiae at 9, 
Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t., Inc. 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) (No. 13-720); Feldman, 
supra note 21, at 136–78.  
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particular, courts should be wary of arguments that rest with light 
levels of support on the fringes of a broad interpretation of 
supposed congressional purposes. 
Beyond the background commerce and contract systems 
necessary for patent licensing, states traditionally have played a 
role in disciplining abusive or improper assertion of legal rights.165 
Thus, while a federal rights system such as the Patent Act may 
serve the purpose of promoting innovation, states in this posture 
serve different purposes,166 ones that are of local importance in 
their jurisdictions, such as the maintenance of appropriate societal 
behaviors. These commercial, contractual, and legal assertion 
issues also may touch on other concerns that are distinctly local 
and may vary across localities, from wage impacts, to effects on 
hiring of local skilled and unskilled workers, to the creation of 
industry clusters.167 Regardless of whether one believes that 
experimentation in innovation policies may be useful across 
jurisdictions,168 commercial, contractual, and consumer laws are 
traditionally viewed as appropriate for experimentation across state 
jurisdictions, and appropriate forums for reflecting and promoting 
local values. To paraphrase one constitutional law scholar, states 
must be left with something to do.169 Most important, none of these 
expressions of a state’s proper role suggests that a state should be 
restricted to the realm of fraud and bad faith. 
In examining modern Supreme Court jurisprudence, an 
additional theme bubbles up through a number of the cases. It is a 
theme that can provide a useful tool for understanding preemption 
cases, in general, and patent preemption, in particular. It is not 
clearly articulated as such, and it certainly does not play out 
consistently in all cases. Nevertheless, it is a useful lens for making 
sense out of some of the more difficult questions. One can call the 
concept “heart and periphery.” Specifically, a state law that goes to 
the heart of federal legislation is more likely to be problematic; a 
state law that affects the periphery is more likely to be accepted. A 
heart and periphery approach can be vital for analyzing whether 
express preemption language is intended to apply to the particular 
                                            
165.  See Gugliuzza, supra note 2, at 24.  
166.  See id.; see also Fromer, supra note 112, at 279.  
167.  See Camilla A. Hrdy, Commercialization Awards, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 
13 (2015) (discussing state interests in the context of creating commercialization 
incentives that do not require creating new forms of exclusive rights). 
168.  For an interesting exploration of when such experimentation might be 
appropriate, see Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 
VIRGINIA L. REV. 65 (2015). 
169.  See Young, supra note 4, at 1387. 
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variation of state law and what preemption implications may exist 
in the absence of express language. 
Unsurprisingly, difficulties frequently occur when courts are 
trying to interpret those things that fall within the interstices, that is, 
what Congress did not describe directly—even when there is some 
form of preemption language—but arguably relate to or fall within 
the ambit of what is covered.170 In the challenging interstitial 
spaces, the analysis should consider the focus of the particular 
statute or provision at issue. To use a somewhat simplistic 
copyright example, if a federal statute creates protection for music, 
a state provision that also creates protection for music goes to the 
heart of the statute and, thus, is more likely to falter on the shoals 
of preemption. A state statute about professional licensing for 
musicians is less likely to be preempted. Similarly, if a federal 
statute creates intellectual property protection for medical 
procedures, a state provision that also creates protection for 
medical procedures goes to the heart of the statute while a state 
statute about professional licensing for doctors sits at the periphery 
and is less likely to be preempted.  
The Court has come close to articulating the concept of heart 
and periphery. For example, in the case of English v. General 
Electric, the Court found the state regulation of how management 
handles employee complaints about safety to be too tangential to 
federal regulations on what is required for nuclear plant safety.171 
In a number of other cases, the lens of heart and periphery brings 
clarity to the decisions, even if the Court does not articulate the 
concept. Consider AT&T v. Concepcion. The case involved cell 
phone contracts providing for arbitration of all disputes and 
requiring that claims must be brought individually, and not as part 
of a class.172 A cell phone user challenged the class action waiver 
as unconscionable under California contract doctrine. The Federal 
Arbitration Act contains both a preemption clause and a savings 
clause: “[A] contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce 
                                            
170.  Cf. Feldman, supra note 102, at 79–90 (arguing that, in the context of 
law in general rather than preemption, human nature and the nature of the legal 
system relentlessly create evolution by driving the system towards issues within 
the interstices of what has come before). 
171.  See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 85–86 (1990) (“[E]ven 
though [certain state] laws could be said to affect tangentially some of the 
resource allocation decisions that might have a bearing on radiological safety, 
[the state tort law claim for IIED] is neither direct nor substantial enough to 
place petitioner’s claim in the pre-empted field.”). 
172.  AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Vincent Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 
(2011).   
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to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such 
contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract.”173 The majority upheld the class 
action waiver, reading the Arbitration Act as reflecting a liberal 
policy favoring arbitration and an intent to enforce arbitration 
contracts according to their terms.174 Over the objection of four 
dissenting Justices, along with an opinion concurring in the result, 
the majority read the language to provide that state law may 
invalidate arbitration clauses in the case of generally applicable 
contract provisions, but not provisions that derive their meaning 
from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.175 Thus, the 
Court held the California Supreme Court’s line of decisions finding 
many arbitration class action waivers to be unconscionable was 
preempted by federal law. 
Concepcion may best be understood from the perspective that 
promoting arbitration contracts goes to the heart of the Federal 
Arbitration Act. Thus, in a close case on the meaning of the 
preemption language, the actions of the state court were more 
likely to be rejected because the state’s activity went to the heart of 
the federal scheme.  
While Concepcion parses through the meaning of particular 
wording in express preemption language, the concept of heart and 
periphery also can be seen in cases involving broader inquiries. 
For example, consider Watters v. Wachovia,176 which concerned 
whether the National Bank Act preempted state regulation of a 
local mortgage entity that was a subsidiary of a national bank. The 
federal law contains general language that “[n]o national bank shall 
be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal 
law.”177 The state had asserted the subsidiary should be subject to 
state licensing and auditing regulations, which would not be the 
case for a federal bank.178  
In describing the interplay of state and federal powers, the 
Court in Wachovia took pains to describe the extent to which state 
laws may apply to banks operating in their jurisdiction, even when 
those banks are federally chartered. The Court noted that state 
usury laws may govern the maximum rate of interest charged by a 
                                            
173.  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2015). 
174.  AT&T v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745. 
175.  Id. at 1745–46. 
176.  Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007). 
177.  See id. at 11 (citing National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2006)). 
178.  See id. at 6. 
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federal bank, contracts made by federal banks are governed and 
construed by state law, and their acquisition of property is 
governed by state law.179 Nevertheless, the Court found the state 
actions preempted as being in conflict with federal banking laws, 
even as to a state chartered subsidiary, noting in particular that 
“[s]ecurity against significant interference by state regulators is a 
characteristic condition of the ‘business of banking’ conducted by 
national banks, and mortgage lending is one aspect of that 
business.”180 In this case, the state’s activities simply encroached on 
the heart of federal banking legislation—that is, the uniform federal 
regulation of the day-to-day business of banking. 
 The notion of looking at the heart of the federal regulation as 
opposed to peripheral concerns also may have animated Justice 
Scalia’s spirited dissent in this year’s decision of Oneok v. Learjet, 
which was joined by Justice Roberts.181 The claim related to state 
antitrust law and federal authority over natural gas pricing as 
provided in the Natural Gas Act. Justice Scalia objected to the 
majority’s argument that the state claims must go forward in order 
to avoid trampling state autonomy in many areas.   
One need not launch this unbounded inquiry into the 
features of state law in order to preserve the States’ 
authority to apply tax laws, disclosure laws, and blue sky 
laws to natural-gas companies. . . . The [Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission’s] authority to regulate gas 
pipelines . . . is a power to address matters that are 
traditionally the concern of utility regulators, not a broad 
license to promote the general welfare.182 
In other words, from the dissent’s perspective, application of 
state law in this case reached into the heart of federal energy 
legislation; one should find preemption without in any way 
threatening state autonomy in peripheral areas. 
At its best, the current concept of looking at the purposes of 
federal legislation to understand the preemption boundaries could 
carry the ball for understanding what is central and what is 
peripheral. Unfortunately, purposes analysis all too often has 
become a wide-ranging and open-ended inquiry in which courts 
have reached well beyond what Congress actually articulated in 
                                            
179.  Id. at 11. 
180.  Id. at 18. 
181.  See Oneok v. Learjet, 135 S. Ct. at 1604 
182.  See id. at 1607 (internal citation marks omitted). 
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the legislation. It can allow the type of unmoored analysis that can 
be troubling, bordering on imagining what Congress would have 
decided if it had thought about this point. It can also lead opinions 
down the garden path of unsupported economic and policy 
analysis, for example, exploring what the supposed economic 
effects of state IP-like protections might be and whether those 
protections are good or bad for national innovation.183 Such 
economic and policy analyses generally belong in the legislative 
domain, rather than that of the courts. As the Supreme Court 
noted in a 2015 patent opinion not related to preemption, claims 
related to the consequences of a particular policy for innovation 
are more appropriately addressed to Congress, “[t]ruth be told, if 
forced to decide that issue, we would not know where or how to 
start. Which is one good reason why that is not our job.”184 
Moreover, in the context of preemption, this type of broad analysis 
risks straying considerably from anything that Congress actually 
decided. With its tendency to stray into that territory, the legislative 
purposes analysis, as currently configured, falls short.  
Moving from the overly broad to the overly narrow, heart and 
periphery can be useful concepts for avoiding the type of hyper-
technical parsing of words that has tangled up the Court at times. 
Consider the case of Altria Group v. Good.185 Altria concerned the 
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, which establishes “a 
comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette labelling 
and advertising with respect to any relationship between smoking 
and health.”186 The Act contains express preemption language 
providing that “[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking 
and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to 
advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which 
are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.”187 
Petitioners had sued under a state unfair trade practices act 
alleging that Philip Morris’s cigarette advertising had fraudulently 
suggested that its light cigarettes delivered less tar and nicotine to 
consumers despite the company’s knowledge that the claim was 
not true.
188
 In concluding that the state act was not preempted, the 
Court focused on the words “based on” in the federal act’s phrase, 
                                            
183.  See supra text accompanying notes 134, 145 (describing the Court’s 
policy rationale in Sears and Bonito Boats). 
184.  See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t., LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2414 (2015).  
185.  Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70 (2008). 
186.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1984). 
187.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2009). 
188.  See Altria Group v. Good, 555 U.S. at 72–73. 
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“[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health 
shall be imposed under State law with respect to advertising or 
promotion of any cigarettes.”189 The majority concluded that the 
notion of advertising and promotion “based on smoking and 
health” had a much narrower preemptive reach than created by 
the words “relating to,” which had been found to have much 
broader reach in preemption clauses of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and ERISA legislation.190 The 5-4 decision 
included a strong dissent, calling the decision “unwise and 
unnecessary” and noting that the majority had chosen to follow a 
prior plurality opinion, which the plurality itself had noted “lacked 
theoretical elegance.”191  
Once again, focusing on what was central to the preemption 
provision as opposed to what was peripheral could have 
highlighted problems with the majority analysis. The heart of the 
federal preemption clause concerned cigarette advertising, which 
should have made preemption a more likely finding.  
This is not to suggest that the concept of heart and periphery 
can solve all of the difficult issues related preemption. 
Nevertheless, for the locksmith trying various keys until one 
unlocks the door, this adds one more to the ring. Moreover, some 
concept similar to heart and periphery must exist for any rational 
analysis of preemption in a system of concurrent powers, when 
responsibility for governance is shared by state and federal 
authorities in so many areas, from disaster response to dispensing 
medication, to consumer disclosure laws. Without it, anything the 
federal government touches could expand to completely occupy a 
field, and the concept of federalism, with its respect for local 
autonomy and its reverence for the wellsprings of popular support, 
could whither on the vine.192  
Looking through the lens of centrality and periphery provides 
additional support for concluding that state laws related to patent 
demands should be able to reach beyond the realm of fraud. In 
the statutory language and history of the federal Patent Act, certain 
key issues emerge at the heart of the federal scheme.
193
 These 
                                            
189.  Id. at 78–79. 
190.  See id. at 85–86.  
191.  See id. at 92, 94 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing the plurality opinion in 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530 (1992)). 
192.  See Young, supra note 1, at 263–64 (referencing discussions of 
federalism in the context of the wellsprings of popular support). 
193.  See, e.g., 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 111–22 (2015) for patent application 
procedures; id. at §§ 131–35 for PTO examination procedures; id. at §§ 271, 
281–96 for provisions on infringement and damages. 
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include the requirements necessary to obtain a patent and the 
Patent & Trademark Office procedures for so doing, the definition 
of infringement and the measure of damages for infringement, and 
the procedures for filing a claim of infringement or challenging the 
validity of a patent before the Patent & Trademark Office or in 
federal court. These issues—validity, infringement, and federal 
litigation—form the heart, and state laws directed at these issues are 
more likely to conflict with the federal scheme. Within the 
periphery, however, lie a variety of issues that may touch on 
patents without going to the heart of the federal scheme. These 
include the types of issues described at the start of the Article, such 
as, notice requirements, transparency, protection against pressure 
sales tactics, basic contract laws, and others. Fraud remediation 
would certainly fall within the periphery. Nevertheless, fraud 
remediation does not define the entirety of what falls within the 
periphery. The lower courts’ attempt to do so represents a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the importance of state power 
and autonomy in the federal system. 
IV. THE FRAUD FALLACY AND CORPORATE SPEECH 
The discussion above has examined the fraud fallacy in the 
context of the federal doctrine of preemption, but there is an 
additional area in which the fraud fallacy threatens to emerge. One 
could argue that the final arena is even more troubling, because it 
threatens to circumscribe not just state power, but federal power as 
well. The topic relates to the power to regulate corporate 
speech.194 
                                            
194.  For discussions of modern case law related to corporate speech, see 
generally, Victor Brudney, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53 
B.C. L. REV 1153 (2012) (explaining the ways in which commercial speech 
differs from other kinds of speech protected by the First Amendment and 
positing that not all commercial speech warrants such protection); Charles 
Fischette, A New Architecture Of Commercial Speech Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 663 (2008) (contending that the application of the First Amendment 
to commercial speech can be justified by several independent, though perhaps 
interrelated, theories, depending on the context in which it arises); Robert Post, 
The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2000) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court should recognize that the doctrine of 
commercial speech should be reformulated to recognize that it is different from 
fully protected speech, that commercial speech is constitutionally valued for the 
information it disseminates rather than for being itself a valuable way of 
participating in democratic self-determination); Daniel Halberstam, Commercial 
Speech, Professional Speech, and The Constitutional Status Of Social 
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In particular, some scholars and commentators195 have tried to 
take the notion of First Amendment protections for petitioning the 
sovereign unless there is fraud and extend it even further to a more 
general First Amendment protection for speech about patents. If 
that were true, neither the states nor the federal government could 
regulate corporate speech about patents unless the speech falls 
within a few narrow categories, which once again, include fraud.196 
In addition to the First Amendment clause protecting the right 
to petition government, the First Amendment also protects 
“freedom of speech.” All speech is not created equal, however, 
and the Supreme Court determined long ago that core political 
speech receives greater deference than commercial speech.197 
Specifically, the Court defines commercial speech as expression 
related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its 
audience.198 Although courts have struck down regulations related 
                                            
Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771 (1999) (presenting a critical review of the 
development of the Court's governing commercial speech framework). 
195.  Adam Mossoff, Demand Letters and Mandatory Disclosures: First 
Amendment Concerns, GEORGE MASON U. CENTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BLOG, (Apr. 29, 2014) available at 
http://cpip.gmu.edu/2014/04/29/demand-letters-and-mandatory-disclosures-first-
amendment-concerns/ (“As property rights, patents can be freely conveyed or 
licensed in the marketplace.”); H.R. __, A Bill to Enhance Federal and State 
Enforcement of Fraudulent Patent Demand Letters: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade of the H. Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce, 113th Cong. 2d Sess. (2014) (statement of Prof. Adam 
Mossoff), available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20140522/102255/ 
HHRG-113-IF17-Wstate-MossoffA-20140522.pdf; see also Statement of Alex 
Rogers, Qualcomm, Inc., at same session for further First Amendment 
arguments, available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20140522/102255/ 
HHRG-113-IF17-Wstate-RogersA-20140522.PDF (“[T]he First Amendment 
affords broad protection for activities relating to the enforcement and 
communication of patent rights”). 
196.  See sources cited at note 195, supra; see also cases cited at note 28, 
supra. 
197.  See Zauderer v. Office of Disc. Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 
626, 651 (1985) (applying a rational review test and holding that a state can 
require commercial speech to include “purely factual and uncontroversial 
information” without violating the First Amendment as long as the disclosure 
requirements are “reasonably related” to the state’s interest in protecting 
consumers from deception); Cent’l Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563–70 (1980) (holding that heightened but not strict 
scrutiny applies to regulation of commercial speech). The lower federal courts 
have varied on the level of scrutiny applied in commercial speech cases. 
198.  See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976) (defining commercial speech as “speech which 
does no more than propose a commercial transaction”) (citing Pitt. Press Co. v. 
Pitt. Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973); see also Cent’l 
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to commercial speech from time to time, these have tended to fall 
into categories including the complete suppression of speech, such 
as forbidding advertising, or regulation of a political message 
outside the commercial activity of the corporation.199 For example, 
courts have expressed particular sensitivity to regulation of 
commercial speech that compels a commercial actor to further a 
particular political message.200 
                                            
Hudson v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. at 561 (defining commercial speech as 
“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its 
audience”). 
199.  See United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001) (finding 
that a mushroom producer’s First Amendment rights were violated when 
disclosure requirements required information that was not purely “factual and 
uncontroversial,” especially when the disclosure is normative speech pushing a 
governmental agenda); Riley v. Nat’l Fed. of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S 781, 782 
(1988) (invalidating a North Carolina law requiring fundraisers to disclose the 
portion of each donation retained as their fee and holding that, in light of 
concerns over the chilling effect, the commercial speech doctrine did not apply 
because the commercial elements of the speech were “inextricably intertwined 
with the otherwise fully protected speech involved in charitable solicitations”).  
200.  For Supreme Court cases evidencing this concern, see cases cited 
supra at note 199. Lower court cases on the topic include Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. 
SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (2014) (finding that labeling requirements specifying inclusion 
of origin of gems as from either conflict free zones or non-conflict free zones 
violate the First Amendment because the governmental interest at issue is not 
concerned with preventing consumer deception); Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 
F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (finding that Zauderer applies to 
government interests other than those protecting against consumer deception; a 
rational basis review determines that required disclosure of country of origin of 
meat is purely factual commercial speech and thus permissible under principles 
of Zauderer); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 
2012) (finding that Zauderer decision is limited to cases in which disclosure 
requirements are “reasonably related” to state’s interest in preventing the 
deception of consumers); Beeman & Pharm Servs v. Anthem, 652 F.3d 1085 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (holding that “not all fact-based disclosure requirements are subject to 
First Amendment scrutiny”; only disclosures that “affect the content of the 
message or speech by forcing the speaker to endorse a particular viewpoint or 
by chilling or burdening a message that the speaker would otherwise choose to 
make” trigger First Amendment scrutiny); N.Y. Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y. City Bd. of 
Health, 556 F.3d 114, 132 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that Central Hudson’s 
“intermediate scrutiny” test is “expressly limited to cases in which a state 
disclosure requirement is supported by no interest other than the gratification of 
consumer curiosity”; applying rational review standard of Zauderer to uphold a 
requirement that restaurants include calorie content on menus, even though it’s 
not an issue of consumer deception); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 
F.3d 294, 310, 316 (1st Cir. 2005) (rejecting argument that Zauderer holding is 
limited to curing deception in consumer advertising and using Zauderer rational 
review standards to find a statute valid that requires disclosure of financial and 
business information); Envtl. Def. Ctr. Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 850 (9th Cir. 
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One would expect patent demands to fall within the category 
of commercial speech. Recent patent commentary, however, has 
suggested that licensing demands should not be treated as pure 
commercial speech, but rather as some new form of hybrid 
speech.201 According to this perspective, patent demands are not 
purely commercial because they relate to enforcement of legal 
rights, and speech pertaining to enforcement of legal rights ought 
to be elevated to a greater level of protection. 
Despite this aspirational and creative framing, patent demands 
do fall squarely within the confines of commercial speech. It is 
difficult to understand how a letter demanding payment for the use 
of an invention relates to anything other than the “economic 
interests of the parties.” In addition, many communications about 
commerce carry the implication, and sometimes the direct 
mention, of the potential to resort to the courts to enforce one’s 
legal rights. This would be true of everything from contract 
negotiations, to employment agreements, to real estate sales, to 
anything that contains an arbitration clause. It cannot be that all of 
these communications should be elevated from the position of 
commercial speech to the high plane generally reserved for core 
political communication or even an intermediate plane in which 
the government tries to compel a commercial actor to carry a 
political message. Nor can it be that the government’s legitimate 
interests are limited to fraud remediation or preventing deceptive 
practices.202 And, of course, if such limitations were to be true, 
                                            
2003) (upholding EPA regulations requiring storm sewer providers to distribute 
educational materials; Zauderer analysis held not relevant because speech is 
purely factual and non-ideological and specific content was not specified); Nat’l 
Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 113–16 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that the 
rational review standards of Zauderer decision is not limited to cases involving 
consumer deception but applies to other state interests as well). 
201.  See Testimony of Adam Mossoff before the Committee on Energy & 
Commerce Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade (May 22, 
2014) available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/default/files/ 
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22.pdf; Mosoff, supra note 195.  
202.  The circuits disagree over whether the Supreme Court cases can be 
read to have such an implication as well. Compare R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 
v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Zauderer rational basis test is limited to 
cases in which disclosure requirements relate to preventing the deception of 
consumers), with N.Y. Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (applying rational basis review standard of Zauderer to uphold a 
requirement that restaurants include calorie content on menus, even though it is 
not an issue of consumer deception), and Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 
429 F.3d 294 (1st Cir. 2005) (rejecting argument that Zauderer holding is limited 
to curing deception in consumer advertising and using Zauderer rational basis 
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they would apply with equal force to Congressional legislation as 
well as state legislation, given that their origin is attributed to the 
First Amendment’s protections. 
Moreover, the argument threatens to blur the boundaries 
between the First Amendment’s right to petition government for 
the redress of grievances, which under modern law includes 
petitioning the courts, and the First Amendment’s right to free 
speech. It is the First Amendment’s “right to petition government” 
clause that, through the Noerr line of cases, has been extended to 
include enforcing legal rights in court. Sliding that logic over to the 
First Amendment’s protection for free speech would mean that we 
now have an even further extension of what began as an antitrust 
notion about the right to speak to the legislature. That last, rickety 
extension—of a doctrine already stretched beyond any semblance 
of its original meaning—is simply one bridge too far. 
CONCLUSION 
The concept of federalism, as applied by the circuit courts in 
relation to patents, has travelled far from its roots. Using weak 
foundational logic, the courts have taken concepts intended to 
protect citizens from the chilling effects of antitrust law and 
stretched them to conclude that states may not pass laws related to 
patent demands outside of litigation, unless those state laws relate 
to remediation of fraud. If allowed to flourish, this fraud fallacy 
would prevent state laws from affecting a wide range of behavior, 
from transparency, to disclosure, to protection against pressure 
sales. As the Court noted in Aronson, “state law is not displaced 
merely because the contract relates to intellectual property that 
may or may not be patentable.”203  
Most importantly, the theory applied to patent preemption 
questions threatens to bleed into a wide range of preemption 
issues, as well as to issues related to corporate speech. From this 
perspective, the fraud fallacy and its wide-ranging language 
threatens to have a lasting effect on the ability of state law to reflect 
and respond to local democratic demands, as well as even the 
federal government’s ability to legislate effectively. 
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